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ABSTRACT

This study analyzes the anatomy of Kreps' research program. That
program probes the mysteries of social process, social structure and
social organization through the use of a code of structural elements -domains (D), tasks (T), resources (R), and activities (A).
The impetus for this study derives from my concern that a common
taxonomy of structural elements applied to ostensibly similar empirical
situations will not always yield common results. To explain such
outcomes, three studies are appraised with regards to methodology, units
and focus of analysis and, finally, application of Kreps' code. These
studies are as follows: origins -- the search for emergent organization;
social networks -- the search for structural linkages between existing
organizations; and restructuring of extant organizations. The
methodology for my study involves an application of methodological
commitments derived from the origins study onto case materials (the
empirical and conceptual content) relative to the social network study.
This sensitizing procedure also analyzes origins data by the methodology
employed in the social networks study.
Of major interest is the fact that each of these studies reveals
some important dimensions of structural statics and dynamics. It is
noted that these three studies are mutually constitutive of temporally
and spatially bounded events involving individual and social entities.
The point is made, finally, that these conceptual similarities are
masked by different theoretical and conceptual meanings for the elements
employed by the studies. Moreover, these differences affect the
application of Kreps' structural code. A call is made within the final
section for an integrated and inclusive approach to these complementary
facets of empirical reality in order to 1) illustrate the strengths and
weaknesses of each methodology as they now stand and 2) thus avoid the
contrasting portraits of similar events painted by the discrete and
parochial studies.

ORIGINS, NETWORKS, AND RESTRUCTURING
AN ANALYSIS OF THREE METHODOLOGIES

INTRODUCTION

The following study involves a critical examination of Kreps'
structural code as it is applied across a diverse empirical and
conceptual landscape. It may be described also as an exercise, the
culmination of which, hovers somewhere between epistemological discovery
and methodological critique. I was, at times, hard pressed to
differentiate between the two.

One of the strengths of the Kreps'

research program is its implementation of a common, alphabetic code of
structural elements -- (D) Domain, (T) Tasks, (R) Resources, and (A)
Activities -- the properties of which are considered to represent basic
building blocks of social structure. The conceptual and linguistic
common ground provided by the code facilitates description of various
structural outcomes which result from the association between
individuals, with varying commitments, across diverse events. These
events have as their catalyst, in all cases, some form of natural
disaster.
One of these structural outcomes of human association, better
known as organization, is said to be in existence if, and when, all four
elements are documented in logical conjunction. That is to say, the four
elements describe and characterize the social actions occuring within
some identifiable collectivity. This theoretical property space, as
defined by the code, was employed to search for instances of
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organization which were in some sense emergent (Saunders and Kreps,
1987). In other studies (e.g., Linn and Kreps, 1988), the focal unit of
analysis was not emergent organization, but, rather, emergent patterns
of restructuring by existing organizations; again, using the theoretical
properties of the elements to describe these structural alterations. The
latest research design to implement the code, involves documenting
social network links between two existing organizational units
(organizational dyads) (Kreps and Bosworth, 1988).
It was findings from the social network study which provided the
initial impetus for my study. While the intent of the network study was
to observe and describe relative degrees of interdependence between
dyadic members, the investigators were also interested in the
possibility of indentifying emergent organizations that resulted from
interorganizational processes. Both the origins study (that which sought
emergent organization) and the network study dealt with similar units of
analysis across ostensibly similar environmental contingencies; however,
during the course of the network study, no instances of emergent
organization were located. Such inconsistent methodological outcomes led
Kreps (1988) to say,
While we assume that the absence of four-element forms of
association identified from [the network] data is not an artifact
of methodology, the reader is cautioned to be aware of that
possibility. Studying organization as "thing" and as "process" at
the same time is fraught with a number of methodological and
epistemological dilemmas that need to be given sustained attention
(p. 18).
This research is the first installment ih line with Kreps' call for
"sustained attention".„
While all three studies have as their intellectual core Kreps'
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structural code and explicit theoretical logic, they, nevertheless, do
not share common methodological and epistemological commitments
(Alexander, 1982). And as it seems, contrasting or dissimilar
commitments result in essentially different applications of the code. By
analogy, even though the tools, medium, canvas and model may be the
same, if one artist is concerned with color, one with substance, and one
with form, each of the resulting portraits will be distinctive -complementary facets in interpretation of shared experience.
The research design of this study is essentially exploratory and
sensitizing in nature. As a critique, it does not apply Kreps'
descriptive code and logic in the analysis of a particular social
phenomenon, but, rather, attempts to define the impact of particular
units of analysis and commitments on the consequent applications of the
code. The actual methodology employed a cross analysis of case materials
from, for example, the origins study by the unique set of commitments
found within the social network's methodology. The referent questions
became, thus: How are methodological and conceptual outcomes from one
study altered, when analyzed by the methodological dictates of parallel,
yet, in many ways, divergent studies? Put succinctly: What results when
emergent organizations from the origins study are reanalyzed in terms of
social networks? And what is the outcome if organizational dyad are
reanalyzed in terms of the special properties of the origins
methodology?
The methodology described above has elements of a content
analysis, that is, in particular, a sensitivity to both reliability and
validity with respect to the application of Kreps' elements of social
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structure. It also goes one step further, however, by analyzing both the
commonalities and differences among the three different methodologies
and the effect of different methodological and epistemological
perspectives upon the unique, and rather explicit, prerogatives set
forth in the use of conceptual taxonomies.
In conclusion, this study, even though grounded by

empirical

data, is also interwoven with the conceptual; because of this, an
attempt to define various issue-laden and controversial concepts is also
required. For instance, the first section below represents a tentative
exploration into the enigmatic, and sometimes metaphoric, construct
known as social "structure". The intent here is to compare and contrast
the "nests of commitments" of social theorists such as Collins, Wallace,
and Mayhew, as they wrestle with the "reality" of social structure.
These theorists are felt to exemplify a (sometimes tenuous) paradigmatic
continuum, the polar ends of which represent the schism between
interpretivist and structuralist approaches to the observation of social
phenomenon. Within this discussion, Kreps' unique brand of structuralism
is introduced. The following section (2) outlines Kreps' research
program, with the intent of bringing light to bear on both his
commitment to the reality of social structure and his methodological
assault on social forms of association through the use of a conceptual
taxonomy. This section also introduces a thorough analysis of Kreps'
structural code, as well as some of the critiques and problems which
various reviewers have voiced concerning it. A third section will
address the methods and issues which characterize the origins, social
networks, and restructuring methodologies. And with this backdrop as
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illustration, the research agenda proposed in this study, outlined
above, will be exposited in detail. The concluding section (4) presents
an expose of what were considered key issues and interesting discoveries
uncovered along the way -- and illustrates the importance of selfcritical, and objective, assessments of ongoing-research programs.

7

SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND THEORY

What do sociologists mean when they refer to the notion of social
structure? Is it a tangible phenomenon or merely an ephemeral, yet
heuristic metaphor? Assuming it is "real", how is it constructed? How is
it maintained? While the questions are formidable and fundamental, there
are a few social theorists who have attempted to answer them. Wallace
(1983), for example, holds that social structure is constituted from
"interorganism behavior regularities", while Collins (1981) reconstructs
social structure in terms of "interaction ritual chains". Both notions
bespeak patterns of action which achieve continuity across and within
the confines of time and space. And both construe "the social" in terms
of the phenomena occurring between individuals and not within them. Both
Wallace's and Collins' approach and define social structure -- i.e., the
reality of social structure -- in terms of microinteraction.
Mayhew (1980,1981), in his turn, also takes note of
interrelationships between activity systems, but arrives at different
conceptual outcomes. Social structure, for Mayhew (1980), is best
understood in terms of "social networks"; that is, the sum of
interrelations in which individuals stand with respect to each other.
These interrelations are studied in terms of the "organization of
information" (symbols) and the "organization of materials" (tools).
Probably the key difference between Mayhew's notion of social structure,
and that of Wallace or Collins, is that Mayhew gives entity status to
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social structure. This notion, borne out of the Durkheimian tradition,
advances the idea that empirical expressions and forms of social
structure may be analyzed on their own terms -- social structure sui
generis. Here, properties of structure manifest themselves through
processes which have little to do with the plans, thoughts or desires of
individual participants. Such emergent properties as the societal
division of labor and organizational hierarchies are the unique domain
of Mayhew's structuralism. In this regard, elements of social structure
not only come to define and regulate micro structure and process, but
also stand as co-equal realities with the protoplasm of the human
species. Contrary to Wallace and Collins, then, explanations of
structural processes do not necessarily reduce to individual behavior.
Perhaps Wallace, Collins and Mayhew, each (in his own way), would
agree with Durkheim's point that "society is not a mere sum of
individuals. Rather, the system formed by their association represents a
specific reality which has its own characteristics" (1938:103). In other
words, Wallace's "regularities", Collins' "rituals" and Mayhew's
"organization" relate (1) behaviors or actions which come to be arranged
in ordered and consistent patterns (across time and space) which (2)
constitute a unique reality. For example, both Wallace (1983) and Mayhew
(1983) invoke hierarchy to conceptualize what vertical differentiation
occurs between social phenomenon as a result of patterns of individual
association. Thus, social structure is constructed from patterns of
individual association which may be "aggregated and reaggregated into
collectivities of increasing size and complexity" (Wallace, 1983:170).
Examples of these aggregated forms would include families,
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organizations, bureaucracies, communities, cities, social movements,
societies, and so on. According to this view, hierarchical boundaries
are not static nor are they completely arbitrary; nor, according to
Wallace, should they be regarded as reducible to either the individual
or social structure. Nevertheless, debate has been rather constant as to
the "reality" of either the individual and his actions (e.g., ". . .only
real people can do things" (Collins 1975:12)) or the structural order
for a given population (. . . socialized man [is] first and foremost . .
. a moment--and, above all, the object--of the social totality" (Adorno
1976:242)).
Wallace has said, "it is always and only the analyst who decides
what is and is not a social phenomena (sic), and who decides, therefore,
which participants, behaviors, and regularities constitute the
phenomena" (1983:15). Collins (1981), for instance, views social order
as a unique consequence of social action. Order and the resultant social
structure, therefore, cannot be viewed as having properties and
processes unique to other social entities (e.g., individuals). For
Mayhew, in contrast, patterns of social action are predicated upon
conditions of the social order. Emergent properties of aggregated
actions and properties of individuals, therefore, stand as unique social
entities; entities which spring into existence, change and "die" despite
the protestations of individuals.
Moving ahead to Kreps' treatment of social structure, we find that
individuals and social entities are treated as co-equal realities;
behaviors and rituals of social action are represented by forms of human
association; and regularities point to the temporal and spatial
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dimensions of these "forms". Thus, Kreps speaks of "forms of
association" in an effort to avoid reification of either the individual
or social structure. Forms of association represent a "third reality";
similar to the "third reality" Simmel (1950) proposes:
It is . . . not true that reality can be attributed only to
properly ultimate units, and not to phenomena in which these units
find their forms. Any form (and a form is always a synthesis) is
something added by a synthesizing subject.
More to the point, Kreps speaks of all social phenomena as being
represented by an ontological triangle of individual, unit, and
synthesis of ultimate units, or forms of association. Social structure,
is therefore conceived as a dialectical synthesis between the individual
and social entities, or between action and order. In sum, Kreps (1988)
concludes:
At the most basic level, we agree with Alexander (1982) that
social structure should be defined as problem of action and
problem of order. The problem of action is one of determining how
social units are created and sustained by individuals. The problem
of order is one of determining how individual thoughts and
behaviors are shaped and controlled by social units. . . .
Interpreted as social action, structure is in a constant state of
becoming something else (Berger and Luckmann 1966). But the new
can never be divorced from what is already there (Warriner 1970).
Interpreted as social order, structure is an omnipresent force,
one analyzed on its own terms (Mayhew 1982). But what is always
there is constantly transforming (Giddens 1979). Interpreted
multidimensiona11v as action and order, structure is an
unrelenting paradox (p. 46; emphasis in the original).
Thus, according to Kreps, to describe "forms of human association", if
this is indeed the basic subject matter of sociology, the analysis must
inevitably include both the individual social actor or agent,
conceptualized in terms of social action, and the omnipresent context or
structural environment, conceptualized as the social order.
While reconciliation between rival factions is always desirable,
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arriving at such a point is rarely easy. If, for example, Wallace and
Collins do not assign the same entity status to "forms" of human
interaction, they are not likely to fathom the "paradoxical" nature of
social structure. Similarly, if Mayhew remains unconvinced that
individuals are cognitively capable of sustaining such "supraindividual"
structures such as the division of labor, then complex forms of social
reality could not be constructed from chains of interaction rituals. The
viability of Kreps' contentions as a possible "middle ground" rests in
part on whether or not theorists of different persuasions can be
convinced that 1) events occurring within and between human populations
are truly recurrent across divergent empirical contingencies, and 2)
these recurrent events can be described fully and precisely using a
taxonomy of four structural elements (discussed below).
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KREPS' RESEARCH PROGRAM

Utilizing disasters as "organization-creating catalysts", a large
part of the research by Kreps et al. has centered around 1) defining
positively and, thereby, identifying instances of emergent
"organization" and 2) exploring the activity processes between unit
and/or individuals which yield "organized" outcomes. The circumstance of
disaster seems exceptional for this task because the emergency period
disrupts "taken for granted" routines. Within this context Kreps
attempts to discern the difference between the presence and absence of
organizational entities; for, as he states, within this context
"existence of organization is often an issue rather than a given for
these entities" (Kreps 1988b:1). Furthermore, a structural code is
employed "for the purposes of describing how nascent organizations
emerge, established ones restructure over time, and either nascent or
established types go out of existence" (Kreps 1988b:2). By not taking
organization (or the activity processes from which they are constructed)
for granted, Kreps explores such basic questions as: What is
organization? When do the disaster-related activities among social units
reflect organization? What distinguishes organization from other forms
of human association?
In the pursuit of answers to these questions, the description of
forms of human association, conceived as stages of organizing or re
organizing, is the result of "continuous feedback between empirical
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events - - a s revealed by the archives -- and a structural code (A, R, T,
D) . . ." (Bosworth and Kreps, 1988). In what follows, Kreps' structural
code, the resulting taxonomy, and some of the conceptual issues which
relate to each will be explored.

The Structural Code
According to Kreps (1988c), "A structural code is a system of
symbols (the genetic alphabet is an example) which serves as a basic
building block of some subject matter. The symbols . . . are sequenced
in various ways to classify objects of inquiry at different taxonomic
levels" (p. 2). Kreps' structural code is composed from four such
symbols, each of which represent some essential building block of social
structure - - domains (D), tasks (T), resources (R), and activities (A).
The conceptual, "core properties" of each are highlighted below (Kreps
1988:8-9):
Domain (D)
Domains are bounded spheres of human activity which point to
the existence of a unit and what it does. As things, domains are
collectively represented in the communications of (1) those
included in these spheres of activity and (2) those who interact
with them at the boundaries of the unit (Levine and White 1961;
Thompson 1967; Haas and Drabek 1973). Domains are objective
(external) and in the Durkheimian sense real and constraining.
They are also subjective (internal) and in the Weberian sense
individually created and legitimated (Durkheim 1938; Weber 1968;
Giddens 1976, 1979; Alexander 1982a, 1982b, 1983). A unit
specification does not imply anything else about the existence of
organization.
Tasks (T)
Tasks are specifications of a division of labor for the
enactment of human activity. As things, they independently define
the unit quality of social action. Whle domain represents social
structure as open system that is legitimated internally and
externally, tasks point to it as closed system that is structured
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from within (Thompson 1967; Perrow 1967). As part of a process,
tasks are a unique expression of structure.
Human and Material Resources (R)
Resources are the material technologiesand subjective
attributes of human populations. Their presencein a process as
things comes to be defined with reference to the unit quality of
social structure, but they may be mobilized prior to or following
the emergence of domains and tasks. Resources are both static and
dynamic: static because their relevance as a part of organization
is conditioned by the external reality of domains and tasks;
dynamic because domains and tasks are the social constructions of
human beings.
Activities (A)
Activities are the interdependent Tconjoinedl actions of human
populations which at once establish and are conditioned bv social
structure. As things, activities are the remaining social means of
organization which, although analytically distinct, relate
symmetrically with its interpretation as thing (unit) and process
(response). Activities are no more or less conceptually important
than the remaining three elements. Certainly D, T, R, and A all
are grounded in the actor, as reality and creator of the unit.
However, each is equally grounded in the unit, as reality and
constraining force (Warriner 1956, 1970; Giddens 1979; Alexander
1982a).
On a theoretical level, Kreps' structural code aspires to capture
the importance of, for example, both subjectivity and objectivity (the
immaterial and the material), and both the individual and social unit as
objects of inquiry. The code, furthermore, endeavors to describe
organization, one particular form of association, as both a static and
dynamic phenomenon - - a s "thing" and as "process". An underlying premise
of Kreps' work relates to what he feels is the "paradox of social
structure". Consonant with the idea that social reality is "nothing more
than streams of events", organization exists as a temporally and
spatially definable entity which is constantly in flux, but this
transformational quality is constrained by what already exists in its
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historically relevant environment.
Analytically, "each element is . . . distinct from the others and
relates equally with structure as unit and as process" (Kreps, 1988:47).
This means that (1) each of the elements be considered to be unique
expressions of social structure, (2) the existence of organization is
predicated upon the co-presence of the elements, and (3) no pattern

in

the arrangement of the elements may be assumed (Kreps, 1988:47).
Expressed as "forms of association", the arrangement of the elements in
all logically possible combinations and permutations results in a
taxonomy of sixty-four social structural processes. The derived taxonomy
includes 4 one-element forms, 12 two-element forms, 24 three-element
forms, and 24 four-element forms (see Table 1).
Dedending on the nature of a particular study's "objects of
inquiry" (restated below as the parochial units and foci of analysis in
any given study), distinct combinations of these elements symbolize
varying social forms and functions. In the origins methodology, for
example, only the four-element forms are sufficient for organization to
exist, the remaining 40 types come to represent stages in a nascent
organization's "birth" (Kreps, 1985). This temporal and conceptual
evolution of nascent entities remains a somewhat unique property space
of the origins use of the code. One of the findings of this study, which
will be discussed at length below, relates to the fact that varying
units and foci of analysis come to affect both the methodological
application of the elements and their taxonomic significance.
First, however, the following installment will further elucidate,
with the help of various critical reviewers, the conceptual significance
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TABLE 1:

Organizational
Forms

D-T- R-A
D-T- A-R
D-R- A-T
D-R- T-A
D-A- T-R
D-A- R-T
T-R- A-D
T-R- D-A
T-A- D-R
T-A- R-D
T-D- R-A
T-D- A-R
R-A- D-T
R-A- T-D
R-D- T-A
R-D- A-T
R-T- D-A
R-T- A-D
A-D- T-R
A-D- R-T
A-T- D-R
A-T- R-D
A-R- D-T
A-R- T-D

Taxonomy of Forms of Association

Three
Element
Forms

Two
Element
Forms

One
Element
Forms

D-T-R
D-T-A
D-R-A
D-R-T
D-A-T
D-A-R
T-R-A
T-R-D
T-A-D
T-A-R
T-D-R
T-D-A
R-A-D
R-A-T
R-D-T
R-D-A
R-T-D
R-T-A
A-D-T
A-D-R
A-T-D
A-T-R
A-R-D
A-R-T

D-T
D-R
D-A
T-R
T-A
T-D
R-A
R-D
R-T
A-D
A-T
A-R

D
T
R
A
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and unique theoretical property spaces of each element in Kreps'
structural code.

Criticisms of Kreps' Structural Code

It should be noted that various reviewers have had difficulty
conceptualizing the adequacy of each of the elements in capturing either
the unique dynamics of social organizing or the empirical properties of
social structure. These difficulties, undoubtedly, stem from Kreps' use
of taxonomy to describe social structure, in general, and perhaps the
relative significance or theoretical importance of each of the elements
in particular (Turner, 1988; Wallace, 1988). Other problems are
methodological in character. In what follows, the attempt will be made
to step into Kreps' shoes and, accordingly, try to deal with some of the
criticisms which have been encountered.
Activities (A)
Collins (1981; 1986 [personal correspondence between Collins and
Kreps]), for example, building from his conception of social structure
as "interaction ritual chains", sees within the element activities (A)
all the requisite material (i.e., human beings) for organization (and
social structure) to emerge. As is implied by "interaction ritual
chains", social action, under the rubric ritual, has both a meaningful
and purposive connotation. Thus, through "micro-translation", social
structure becomes the aggregation of meaningful and purposive
interaction. Kreps, however, uses activities (A) to relate more the form
than the content of social action.
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As an illustration of their differences, Collins' (1988) thoughts
in describing tactical warfare as "deliberate organizational breakdown"
(p. 297) can be used. It is Collins' contention that the battle is won
by that army which is able to maintain its organizational integrity as
it forces the enemy's organization to the breaking point. Using as the
conceptual take-off point, "interaction ritual chains", it might seem
that breakdown would occur if and when key participants (links in the
chain) are "lost" (e.g., killed) in the confrontation. Interestingly,
however, in terms of the bureaucratically structured modern army Collins
(1988) is led to observe, "At a larger level, an entire army is defeated
when its overall structure reaches a level of chaos at which minimal
coordination and supply is no longer possible" (p.298).
Meaning and purpose between organizational participants is
important for organization to exist, however, no amount of normative
consensus will save an army from itself once supply routes are cut,
information lines severed, and its coordination disrupted. Thus,
empirically, "interaction ritual chains" seem to become more and more
contingent on macrostructural processes at ever higher levels of
aggregate complexity, thereby also losing points in the battle for
explanatory importance. In sum, while "organization", for Collins, is
attributed to micro-processes, ironically, "disorganization" is mainly a
macro phenomenon.
On another front, Collins and Turner (1988), for instance, have
posed an interesting argument relating to activities (A) which goes
something like this: How is the element activities (A) to be made
analytically distinct if, in every event of organizing, what is
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happening can only be observed through the actions of participants. In
other words, are not all actions related to the organizing event some
form of activities (A)? The answer would have to be yes, if one were
committed to the level of microinteractional processes and the study of
meaningful actions undertaken by willful actors (what Kreps refers to as
"interpretive sociology").
Kreps, however, in employing activities (A), is seeking the
structural correlates of some human population or populations conjointly
engaged in any possible event of organizing. And in partial answer to
the argument above, Kreps observes:
It might be asked: isn't A logically primary because conjoined
action depicts structure in its most elemental form? I resist an
affirmative response to this
question. . . . [To] be conjoined in some fashion is to beg
questions about degrees of interdependence. Thus certainly
activities can be described, and in important ways--numerically,
temporally, and spatially--without making any reference to D, T,
and R (1988:141-2).
In point of fact, it must be said that the theoretical significance of
the element activities (A) has been slightly altered depending on the
focus of a particular study: origins, restructuring, or social networks.
The idea of conjoint actions is more cogent to the network study whereas
activities (A) relates to the spatial and temporal continuity between
interacting social units (e.g., organizations). And the numerical
criterion for conjoined actions is contingent on other factors such as
the predominant disaster related activities of some participant unit.
Nonetheless, the importance of structural correlates to
interacting populations, relating to the sheer numbers of individuals
amalgamated in time and space, is not a unique concern for Kreps.
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Numerous theorists have posited size (i.e., population size) as an
important generator of social forms (Mayhew 1980,1981,1983; Simmel
1950). And an important question for Kreps, and others, is to what
degree the sheer numbers of participants engaged in conjoined action
between two social units represents a mere description of the some human
population or a partial explanation for any consequent, emerging social
form?
Regarding time and space, there is really little argument that
anything "social", at some point, communicates the "meeting" of two or
more actors, for whatever reason, upon the world's stage. Wallace
(1983), makes the same case, by separating his "interorganism behavioral
regularities" into physical and psychical categories (i.e. between
social and cultural structure) whereby time and space, then, become part
and parcel of any description of this physical dimension. While he
seemed to have a great deal of difficulty relating to Kreps' research
(see his critique in Kreps (1988)), on this point at least, he seems to
concur. For example, when proposing a generic definition of
"interorganism behavioral regularities", Wallace states, initially, "The
definition thus denotes merely a joint occurrence sometime and/or
somewhere.

..."

(1983:22). He then describes how these joint

occurrences may be defined by temporal and spatial coordinates, but
implies by way of "regularities", "patterned," "structured, "organized,"
or "ordered" activity. Additionally, Wallace contends, "Because the
regularities may be observed across any distance in space and/or time,
some social phenomena may be described as extensive, sparse, or rare,
while others may be described as concentrated, densely packed, or
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ordinary" (Wallace 1983:22).
Even though Wallace does not disclose the criterion by which we
may make judgments about the "concentration" or "sparseness" of human
activities, clearly his definition relates a concern with time, space
and number. Once again, a crucial difference between Wallace and Kreps
(and Collins for that matter) is that Wallace constructs organization
from patterns of interorganism behavior--aggregated "regularities" from
role-performances to role-performance sets to social situses to social
structure (1983:79). Again, in this view, macro structures and processes
are created through micro-interaction and described through concepts
which define one-on-one intercourse (e.g., roles). Time, space and
number, then, are only useful as a description of conjoined action
between actors where both actors and actions are assigned meaning prior
to enactment. Conjoined action, thus, becomes synonymous with
"patterned," "structured," "organized," or "ordered" action -- in
essence, interdependent action.
Kreps is inclined to view, "conjoined action [as] not necessarily
interdependent action.

[Interdependent action] is very much tied to

manifest resources (R) and the flow of verbal and written communication
which specify domains (D) and tasks (T)"(1988:140). In other words,
conjoined action has but a tendency to become patterned or maybe
organized; furthermore, this "tendency" is not necessarily contingent on
microinteraction.
Resources (R)
Perhaps the most easily grasped and understood element in the
code, in relating to organizational requisites, is resources (R).

22
However, in keeping with Kreps and Bosworth's (1988) caveat, "It is
essential to show . . . that the presence of one [element] does not
necessitate the other" (p.15), establishing the nature of resources (R)
is apparently deceiving. For example, Turner (1988) ponders the
question, if "people are resources, how can one have activity without
people?" Naturally, the answer to the question, can one have activity
without people, is no. Kreps (1988) explains:
Probably the key question with resources is how to distinguish A
(activities) from R (human and material resources) if people are
relevant to the definition of both. The poin-t we are trying to
make here is that the presence of resources does not necessarily
mean that the actions of individual or social units are conjoined
in any meaningful sense of the term. The resources are just there-whether they are supplies, equipment, money, or the human
capacities of public officials, employees, volunteers, or
bystanders (p.139).
One really can not

fault Turner or any other reviewer for such

inquiries, because

on an intuitive level all actions would seem to

constitute activities (A) and, in many cases, activities (A) are indeed
incorporated into a larger effort as resources (R); for example, when
ongoing activities

of "unofficial helpers" are merged with the

activities of more

formalized units. In this example,

it wouldseem that

the "unofficial helpers" have become an enabling resource (R) for
further action.
One of the problems, empirically, in reconciling and agreeing upon
the appearance of resources (R) is that the element incorporates such a
conceivably large reservoir of human and material "stuff". What is not
clear to reviewers is that resources do not become resources (R), in the
methodological sense, until they are either utilized by someone or
something or explicitly transferred from one unit to another. And the
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requirements of "utilization" and "transfer" change according to the
particular study or focus of study. This point will be taken up again in
a later section.
Conceptually, again, Kreps is strict in his requirement that the
appearance of conjoined activity (A) or resources (R) not necessarily
imply interdependence. Interdependence, for Kreps, describes the
situation where two units, engaged in some sort of conjoined endeavor,
are "dependent" on the other in one way or another for the continuance
of this operation. It was Thompson (1967) who brought degrees of
interdependence into the conceptual limelight when he depicted the
relationship of branches of a larger organization as representing either
"pooled," "sequential," or "reciprocal" interdependence. All of these
forms involved, in some way, the flow of resources as a prerequisite for
the efficacy and survivability of an organization. Kreps' point remains
that a transfer of resources (R) does not necessarily involve
interdependence between two organizational entities in regards to some
inclusive endeavor or entity.
At times, substantive results from Kreps' research tie in to
certain tenets of resource mobilization theory (McCarthy and Zald,
1977). Leaving behind issues dealing with the politics of social
movements, a fundamental tenet of the resource mobilization approach is
that collective action and organizational viability in noninstitutional
settings are directly linked with the ability to acquire and mobilize
key resources (Jenkins, 1983). In accordance with Kreps' findings, it is
notable that of 28 cases of emergent organization comprised of other
organizations (from an origins study; see Saunders and Kreps, 1987), in

24
no instance were resources (R) the last element of four elements
involved. Moreover, there is only one example where resource (R) was the
next to last element evidenced -- that of D-T-R-A or Kreps' notion of
formal organization. Thus, in 96% of the emergent organizations located,
resources (R) accounted for either the first or second element.
Resource (R) acquisition also seems critically involved in the
legitimation of an emerging entity's domain (D). For example, in
Saunders and Kreps (1987), emergent organizations which began D-R or R-D
accounted for 19 of 28 cases observed. This could mean that an
externally legitimated domain (D) resulted in greater ease in acquiring
resources (R) (i.e., D-R) or that the mobilization of resources (R)
resulted in domain (D) legitimation for whatever group was able to
utilize them (i.e., R-D). Thompson (1967), in his discussion of the
"synthetic organization", describes the R-D situation in this way:
"authority to coordinate the use of resources is attributed to--forced
upon--the individual or groups which by happenstance is at the
crossroads of the two kinds of necessary information, resource
availability and need (p.52)."
This observation either points out an extremely important
organizational dynamic -- the securing of resources (R) serves as an
enabling or focusing point around which organization is possible -- or
it relates a methodological bias. That is to say, since resources (R)
are defined so broadly (i.e., both human and material) perhaps their
location is biased in terms of the overall ease of identification.
Regardless, it is true that transfer or exchange of resources between
organizations is an integral part of the environment of any existing
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organization (Thompson, 1967). Indeed, the majority of social network
linkages noted in Kreps' network study (Kreps and Bosworth, 1988)
involved resources (R). Equally, the efficacy and life-expectancy of an
emergent organization is tied to the acquisition of crucial enabling
resources. In other words, the importance of resources is undeniable;
however, as a piece in a methodological puzzle,

(R) is still being fine

tuned.
Tasks (T)
Both resources (R) and tasks (T) are critical components in the
research literature on both organizations and collective behavior. On
the organizational side, Perrow (1979), for example, considers resources
(R), in the form of technologies, a crucial predictor of organizational
form (e.g., the respective division of labor). For organizational
management theorists, who necessarily take organization for granted, the
key to organizational rationality lies in its control structure or
bureaucratically structured division of labor. On the other side of the
same coin, for some theorists concerned with collective behavior
(especially social movements), the acquisition and mobilization of
resources (R) constitute both crucial enabling or constraining factors.
While Ralph Turner (and Killian, 1987), in his turn, relays concern over
the emergence of an elementary division of labor (Tasks) within
collectivities through his emergent norm thesis.
Kreps (1988), in an integrative effort, relates his conception of
tasks (T) in this way:
Here it is useful to recall Durkheim's critique of utilitarianism
and Simon's (1956) questioning of classical rationality as the
ultimate explanation for a division of labor. Durkheim's
utilitarian actor would never agree to uphold a division of labor;
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and Simon's cognitively limited actor would never be able to
sustain one. As a result, both Durkheim and Simon argue that it is
essential to conceive of the division of labor as, at least in
part, an external reality. That reality commands commitment and
provides coherence. Durkheim expresses the former as normative
unity through collective representations. Simon expresses the
latter as cognitive unity through organizational vocabularies
(Perrow 1972).
Seeking to avoid possible tautological reasoning explicit in the search
for "collective representation", Kreps insists that tasks (T) be in
evidence through written or verbal communications (Kreps, 1988). Thus,
when Turner is puzzled over the classification of tasks (T) (since tasks
(T) ostensibly contain a subjective component) and asks, "how is this to
be determined? Surely not by probing the depths of individual psyches!"
We might ask the same for Turner's emergent norm perspective. How
widespread does this emergent norm have to be? How is its existence to
be determined?
For Kreps, any given human population has but the capacity to
organize; interdependence is not given. The appearance of flow charts,
bureaucratic schematics, and job descriptions facilitate this capacity
by providing participants, in any given organization, with a cognitive
backdrop for action. That job holders are frequently overheard to say,
"That's not my job!" or "That matter is not under my jurisdiction",
gives us a clue to organizational participant's understandings about the
nature of their work. Obviously, the division of labor evidenced in
written and verbal communications does not an organization make.
However, collective agreement over a division of labor, implicitly or
explicitly, as evidenced in communiques, makes for a very potent force.
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As Collins states, "the power of an organization is in its being
taken for granted." This taken for granted reality makes up the
transhistorical reality of "collective representations" which Durkheim
described as being characterized by "exteriority, priority and
constraint" (cited in Turner, 1987). In other words, people act towards
these collective representations as if they had the same entity quality
as a mountain range. Thus, people talk of "fighting city hall" or the
"establishment" for the same reasons they may climb Mount Everest-"because it's there". The same holds true for organizational
participants. If they have their actions defined by written or verbal
"understandings", then these "understandings" give organization an
exterior, prior, and constraining quality. However, that organizations
can and eventually do "wink" out of existence (Mayhew 1983), suggests
that the viability of any organized entity is a contingent process;
within the strength of the taken for granted lie the seeds of
destruction.
The process of establishing tasks (T) empirically is sometimes run
aground by questions and issues such as: Is the requirement of written
or verbal evidence of a task structure biased in terms of larger units?
Or, in dealing with units of varying complexity which may be situated
within larger systems, are we dealing with a division of labor or a
division of authority? Is there a difference? Related to questions of
power, who, within a unit, may create a task structure? And does an
emergent task structure immediately apply to the unit as a whole or to a
smaller segment, within a larger unit, which may be involved in a
separate arena of activities? Each of these questions will be given
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sustained attention below.
Domain (D~)
Thompson (1967) introduced the concept of "domain" in this way:
Domain . . . defines a set of expectations both for members of an
organization and for others with whom they interact, about what
the organization will and will not do. It provides, although
imperfectly, an image of the organization's role in a larger
system, which in turn serves as a guide for the ordering of action
in certain directions and not in others. The concept of domain . .
. can be clearly separated from individual goals or motives.
Regardless . . ., members of hospitals somehow conceive of their
organizations as oriented around medical care, and this conception
is reinforced by those with whom the members interact (p.29).
Kreps is certainly getting at the same thing in describing domains as
(1) identifying bounded entities and what they do and (2) providing
ideas of shared membership and common spheres of activity. The existence
of domain (D), for Kreps, "symbolizes the open system character of
organizing by providing external legitimacy of an entity and what it
does" (Kreps and Bosworth, 1988).
Domain (D), like the other elements, has met with some amount of
incredulity on the part of reviewers. Turner (1988), once again, poses
some astute questions. He observes:
The [elements] are applied on the basis of some agreement as to
what a social unit is doing. But agreement can be at different
levels. An ad hoc crew of volunteer emergency workers like those
described by Louis Zurcher (1983) can develop their own consensus,
with only vague awareness of what they are doing in the larger
community. But from the examples that Bosworth and Kreps present,
the establishment of a domain seems to depend more on the decision
of some higher body representing the whole community--perhaps even
a body whose authority predates the disaster. . . . Why should
Domain have to be legitimated at a;.higher community level than
Tasks (p.167, emphasis in the original)?
As a student of collective behavior, it is no surprise that Turner
worries that Kreps' research might by biased in terms of "continuity
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rather than emergence". Indeed, there could be collective agreement
within a volunteer group as to what they are doing and why. This group
could even manage to uphold a simple task structure. However, until the
activities of this group are observed and legitimated by relevant others
-- at a higher community level -- its entity status wavers on the subtle
distinction between "an organization" and "organized activity". For
Kreps, external recognition and legitimation of a bounded entity is a
necessary requisite for organization to exist, else the situation where
all relevant disaster related activity be assumed as organization merely
because it is not "disorganized".
Be that as it may, Turner does lay out two important points: 1)
Zurcher's ad hoc volunteer group is necessarily going to have more
difficulty than a more established unit in gaining external
legitimation; and 2) domain, as a term which characterizes distinct
spheres of activities, is decided on the basis of researcher agreement.
On the basis of this criterion and assuming that the number of disaster
domains is finite (in Kreps, 1988 (p.16), 29 domains were recognized),
domains may be divided into intelligible categories which capture not
only the perceptions of the observer but may also translate readily into
the way those who are being observed interpret their action. Enacting
units and participants, however, may lay claim to several domains. For
example, a sheriff's department may be involved in a domain specified by
a population of organizations doing the same thing and yet may still
respond to matters which relate to its predisaster domain--although in a
more limited capacity. In this case, the predisaster domain of
maintaining social control may or may not be relinquished in the face of
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demands placed on it by a postdisaster domain involving a cluster of
organizations (Dynes, 1970).
Using the organization as the unit of analysis, Kreps (see, for
example, Kreps and Bosworth, 1988) speaks of domains in terms of
environmental niches or "distinct combinations of resources and other
constraints that are sufficient to support an organization form"
(Aldrich, 1979:28). After a disaster there are usually distinct tasks
and goals which need to be addressed. Given the potential immediacy of
the situation, organizations which cannot meet these goals will be
replaced by those which can -- and the environment no doubt plays an
important role in capitulation of these domains (Dynes, 1970).
In sum, it seems that the element Domain has within it two
analytical distinctions: Domains may specify the boundaries of
populations of organizations performing the same service, or they may
delineate a single organization's activities as unique amongst disaster
related organizations. This distinction, as well as unique
methodological problems associated with locating domain (D), will be
given further attention below.
This concludes the section on Kreps' core species notion of
organization. The movement from activities to domain was deliberate for
two reasons. First, several reviewers have come to the conclusion that
the elements, from activities to domain, represent a continuum from the
concrete to the general; from the empirical to the abstract (e.g.,
Turner (1988), p.167). Kreps (1988) resists such a notion and observes:
[When asked], don't activities, tasks, and domains constitute a
continuum of increasing generality and inclusiveness that can only
be distinguished analytically rather than empirically? Our answer
to the generality part of the question is no. Turner implies that
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individual actions and perhaps meanings are less abstract and more
observable than collective representations. We disagree. The
latter are not just ideas; they are parts of the material culture
(e.g., as written and verbal communications) that can be recorded
just as readily as physical behaviors and psychic states. Until
convinced otherwise, we conclude that all of the elements are
equally concrete or abstract (p.173).
Secondly, in regards to the Collins' and Wallace's explanation of
the social construction of structural reality, behavioral regularities
or recurrent action between individuals (empirically associated with
activities (A)) account for ever more inclusive levels of social
structure. Meaning and interdependence are assumed as individuals
interact (dimensions of tasks and domains), even as they may
unconsciously create and maintain social structures (such as a societal
wide division of labor) they do not fully comprehend (Mayhew, 1981).
While an individual's actions are no doubt meaningful on one level or
another, the individual as perpetual subject undermines the reality of
the exterior, prior, and constraining historical social structures into
which every actor is born and, in many cases, ultimately takes for
granted. In other words, the entity status of social structure is given
short shrift. Moreover, purposive behavior or interaction, as an
explanation for structural creation, maintenance, and change becomes
extremely cumbersome and ridiculous at ever higher levels of form.
Interactionist commitments also disregard the importance of
describing the structural characteristics of social forms. Wallace, as
is pointed out, remains sensitive to structural descriptors by
separating the physical from the psychical behavioral regularities; in
other words, social structure may be hierarchically described in terms
of recurrent behaviors performed by aggregates of individuals which are

circumscribed by time and space. Presumably, psychical behaviors are
arranged hierarchically as well, and eventually correspond with the
hierarchy of physical behaviors. However, in his conception of psychical
behaviors, Wallace winds up with a 6 X 3 table (1983:96) and 18 analytic
categories. If Wallace is trying to facilitate description, perhaps he
is moving in the wrong direction. In the last analysis, both Wallace and
Collins seem to sacrifice descriptive clarity for explanatory
complexity.
Kreps constructs social structure from "forms of association"
which reflect, theoretically, the reality of both the individual and
social unit -- both are subject and object of the social totality.
Entity status of social structure (i.e., organization) is affirmed by
the demarcation of a threshold of existence; four elements present, an
organization becomes another player on the social stage. Equally, the
elements are conceived as representing both physical and psychical
behaviors. Obviously, both tasks (T) and domains (D) contain a psychical
c o m p o n e n t i d e a s in people's heads”. This subjective element, however,
is tempered by the requirement that tasks (T) and domains (D) be
evidenced through written communication. This is further tempered by the
fact that, as "observers" in the events portrayed in the DRC data, Kreps
et al. attempt to substantiate the claims made by participants. In this
sense, as stated above, units have to achieve organization through some
agreement between participants and observers as to what is going on;
this is contrary to a more interpretivist approach whereby a
collectivities' participants are given the benefit of the doubt when it
comes to bandying about unit symbolizations of purpose.
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METHODS AND ISSUES

As I stated in the introduction, the purpose of this study is to
decipher and describe the impact of different epistemological objectives
upon consequent methodological strategies and outcomes. These various
objectives are captured by three core studies:
Origins: the intent here was to locate instances of emergent
organization and reconstruct how they came into being. The
methodology involved first locating an existing, yet nascent,
organization (evidenced in participant interviews obtained through
the Disaster Research Center) with the intent of capturing its
form, taxonomically, through use of the code.
Social Networks: the intent here was to capture and define
interdependencies or network links between social units. This
study exploited data from a study earlier conducted by Drabek
(1981). In Drabek's study, the complete array of network linkages
between significant organizational players were catalogued through
the use of blockmodeling techniques. Kreps' networking methodology
first broke down Drabek's list of organizational participants to
the level of dyads. The important social networks between member
units of this dyad were then analyzed and described through use of
the code.
Restructuring: the intent here was to describe important dynamics
of organizational restructuring. The methodology focuses on one
particular organizational unit as that unit responds to nonroutine
contingencies. The code is then employed to depict and represent
stages of single restructurings and chains of restructurings by
the same unit.
What is not apparent from the perfunctory descriptions above are the
demands placed on the code and researchers by these different units and
foci of analysis.
To more fully understand these dynamics, the units of analysis,
foci of analysis and methods, from each of these three studies will be
detailed. The restructuring study will receive less attention than the
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others. The purpose for its inclusion is to help examine more fully
where the origins and network studies diverge and intersect. This
section will conclude by examining the methodological strategy employed
by this research in light of the following discussion.

Origins
It should be mentioned early on that Kreps' structural code was
initially devised to search for and identify positively the social form
known as organization. The theoretical significance of each of the
elements (and/or combinations of the elements), remains across three
different research strategies -- at times, however, in slightly altered
fashion. The important point to be made here is that the origins study
was first in line. As a result, the network and restructuring studies
have had to reconcile epistemological commitments made early on (e.g.,
four elements present represents organization) with their own
distinctive conceptual and empirical imperatives.
As stated above, the objective of the origins study was to observe
and characterize stages in the creation of an emergent organization -an organization which was not in existence prior to the advent of some
natural disaster. This initially required finding emergent organization
through "spadework" with the DRC archives. According to Kreps (and
Bosworth, 1988), this was done in the following way: "First, direct
participants or others involved in an emergency generally characterize
nascent social units by specific names and spheres of activity. This was
critically important for establishing the existence of emergent
organizations and what they did (domains)(p.12)."

35
Once located, the emergent organization was characterized by the
code through event depictions, the content of informant accounts. One
important "advantage" for this study was that these organizations were
the culmination of processes that were circumscribed by one, and only
one, "event of organizing" -- namely, the gestation period and birth of
an organization. (Throughout the rest of this study, an "event" will
refer to some intersection of time, space, circumstance, and human
material, the collision of which one may confidently look down on and
say, "Something is going on down there." - - a virtual cauldron of
potential organization.) This "advantage" derives from the fact that
these "nascent social units" (and the event of organizing from which
they arise) are described in terms of overall activity processes. And
the initial identification of participants, organizational unit or
individual, is not a critical part of locating these emergent entities.1
Because of this, analyzing degrees of interdependence between discrete
participants is not necessarily important to account for overall
organizational emergence. In sum, what was extremely important in the
network study, was not particularly consequential for the origins study.
The gist of the observations above can be expressed
diagrammatically in the following fashion using an emergent organization
depicted taxonomically as an A-R-D-T form.2 Processes related to the
formation of this emergent organization are analyzed in order to
represent three empirically demonstrable structural possibilities. In
what follows, oex will symbolize the "organizing event" for a nascent
organization, while EC*! will represent the "emergent organization" as
culmination of the organizing process. Furthermore, Ix symbolizes an
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observable individual as social actor (I'sN a plurality of actors),
while 0X represents some identifiable orgnaizational unit.
To proceed with the description of the first structural
possibility:
Flood waters rise over a period of days in the community and
are monitored. Flooding eventually covers much of an urban area
and virtually the entire downtown of its major city. There are few
deaths or injuries but extensive property damage. Major flood
conditions prevail for over a week. The police department
initially is involved in traffic control during the emergency
period, but that action terminates with the complete inundation of
central city streets. Several citizens with boats docked in the
downtown area conjointly begin evacuating people from buildings.
Their preliminary actions are independent of anything being done
by the police department. In fact, police official note that, at
this point, they are looking for something to do.
(1) emergent from individuals or groups of individuals

I 'sN—

oej — -•I2

Here we note the preliminary actions of unaffiliated individuals
(unofficial helpers), who gather in response to some collectively
perceived need. Their actions, while uncoordinated with the actions of
more formal, "official" units, nevertheless, represent the nascent
beginnings of a more encompassing entity --the first observable
installment in this event of organizing. At this point, the evacuation
conducted by these individuals has the potential for organization, but,
as is usually the case, these actions become engaged in a larger effort.
There has been no preplanning for what follows. Having a few boats
of their own, the police coordinate their evacuation actions with
those of private citizens (Activities). The need to evacuate the
entire downtown area quickly becomes apparent. A large number of
boats from other private owners, the bureau of land management,
the fire department, and the military are provided. The latter
public bureaucracies also offer personnel to drive some of the
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boats, and some citizen volunteers respond to the same need. By
now, the majority of police personnel have become involved because
they are available, in close proximity, and know where to take
evacuees (Activities-Resources).
(2) emergent from individuals or groups of individuals and
organizations
Oi
I
I 'sN

oex

02

i3
Now we find that our informal evacuation has been incorporated
into a larger effort spearheaded by the police department with resources
coming in from other organizational units. The event of organizing is
still somewhat "informal" in nature and not yet an organized entity.
This soon changes:
The following morning, local government leaders declare the
downtown evacuation as the responsibility of the police department
(Activities-Resources-Domain). This is questioned briefly but then
accepted by fire department officials and is further legitimated
by state and military officials. The police then quickly develop a
rather complex task structure -- one that involves locating,
notifying, dispatching, and refueling of boats, assigning of
police personnel to all boats, and coordinating of water and
ground transportation to move evacuees to shelter (ActivitiesResources-Domain-Tasks). About 5000 people are evacuated during
the next 3-4 days. The operation is maintained by the police
department until the demand is met (Kreps, 1985:10).
(3) emergent from organizations
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Finally, at the bequest of local government leaders, the operation
is taken over by the police department. The event becomes firmly lodged
in the domain of existing organizational units; and an emergent
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organization arises from the stream of intially informal activities from
which it spawned. Questions of power and legitimation become the concern
of existing units and, in the end, the police department is granted the
commission to dictate how the operation is to be performed.
As it seems, the emergent organization above is most fully
represented by structural possibility two; that is, emergent from some
combination of individual and social units. The important consideration
is that in the origins methodology, the units of analysis are less
important than the focus of the analysis -- who was involved is less
important than what was happening. As Kreps (1988) explains it:
Critical for understanding the approach, the reader must keep in
mind that even though most (all but 52) of the 423 instances of
organization found were enacted by established units of various
types (they existed prior to the event), [their] presence is not
assumed for purposes of studying the process of organization (p.7;
emphasis in the original).
Put another way, the overall event of organizing becomes both the focus
of analysis and the unit of analysis.

Social Networks
While ostensibly dealing with origins as well, the objectives for
the network studies are really quite in contrast to those in the earlier
study. The network study begins with an somewhat exhaustive list of
extant organizational units. The intent, consequently, is to observe the
cluster of associations for one unit in general and its relationship
with other units, expressed as a dyad, in particular. Right away, one
clear contrast to the origins study becomes obvious; namely, the units
of analysis are extremely important and must be specified. Here, the
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question, what may constitute a unit within an organizational dyad,
becomes paramount. Additionally, by examining "cluster of associations"
for one unit, the focus of analysis is catapulted from (a) the sphere of
commitments involving one emergent unit engaged in one event of
organizing (above), into (b) the realm of overall unit commitments
represented throughout the entire disaster response.
The following example (Case #0420 from Kreps' origins materials)3
represents both the dynamics of splintering an emergent organization
into organizational dyads and the prominence of issues relating to
distinguishing member units for dyads.
A small town on the Mississippi gulf coast is devastated by
a hurricane. In the ensuing maelstrom, city buildings and streets
are inundated with water, thus effectively stifling mobility, and
lines of communication are severed so that the town is completely
isolated. For the next two days, civic organizations and residents
are immobilized thus, stymieing any semblance of organized
activities. By the third day, a representative of a nearby NASA
testing facility and resident of the town arrives and offers to
the mayor key resources including personnel and material resources
(water, fuel, and some equipment) which were at his disposal
(Resources). With the influx of these resources, the mayor calls a
meeting with civic leaders including the CD director, the police
chief, town aldermen, and a local doctor to discuss ways in which
these resources should be used. South Central Bell offers a
meeting site for their emerging Emergency Operations Center (EOC)
and, with the help of the NASA representative, the mayor organizes
what comes to be called the overall Civil Defense effort
(Resources-Domain). Over the next few days this group addresses
various demands dealing with communications, the operations of the
evacuation shelters, search and rescue, and the assimilation of
outside assistance into the ongoing effort (Resources-DomainActivities). A task structure emerges from these activities
whereby responsibilities and distinct areas of interest are
divided among EOC representatives (Resources-Domain-ActivitiesTasks).

A schematic representation of the individuals and/or social units
involved in this emergent EOC might look something like this:
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I1 (mayor)
I
t

I6 (doctor)

|

^ l20i (police chief)

I's5' (aldermen)
!3°2 (c^ director)
!
IA (NASA rep.)

In this diagram: Ix and I5 represent individuals affiliated with town
government;
12 0 ! and I302 represent individuals who embody formal
organizations;
I4 represents an individual who wields the resources of
an organization, yet does not embody that
organization;
I6 represents an individual with no relevant
affiliations.
As a source of viable organizational dyads for an analysis of
social networks, this organization, an emergent EOC, contains only one
possibility -- the relationship between social units represented by the
police department and Civil Defense:
0]_ (police) < -- >

02 (CD)

What is not apparent from the event depiction is that the police
department of this small town has only six members, while the Office of
Civil Defense is staffed by two persons -- both acting in a volunteer
capacity with outside commitments. Nevertheless, both would be
considered social units. At the same time, neither the mayor nor the
aldermen, those representatives of town government, would be considered
possible member units for an organizational dyad. Moreover, the NASA
representative does not represent NASA because he was acting in a
citizen capacity. The relevant question becomes as follows: What may
constitute a "social unit", as member of an organizational dyad? This
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issue will be taken up again in the following section.
A final point addressing the event portrayed above. As a

viable

dyad, the relationship between the police department and Office of Civil
Defense did not begin with the EOC. Interestingly, this same dyad was
the focus of an emergent organization located from the archives for the
time period immediately preceding the impact of the hurricane. This
emergent organization, which involved the evacuation activities for the
small town, was constructed from the joint activities of these same
social units. Therefore, this dyadic network had a history which spanned
several organizing events. In the subsequent network methodology both of
these events would have been analyzed in terms of the overall depth of
interdependence between the two social units.
In sum, the network methodology has quite specific units of
analysis. By analyzing organizational or social unit dyads, the first
requirement, by definition, involves identification of all relevant
social units -- possible member units for consequent dyadic pairs. This
requirement is in direct contrast to the origins methodology, whereby
enacting participants are more or less inconsequential to the event
drama at large. In addition, since assessing overall degrees of
interdependence between two social units is the goal for the network
study, the focus of analysis broadens greatly as the entire cluster of
associations between the two organizations is observed. Applying the
code across these diverse events, where organizations and their
representatives bump into each other across multiple domains and
eclectic contingencies, many times results in rather interesting
characterizations of network forms.
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Restructuring
As far as focus of analysis, students of restructuring do not have
to worry with either locating events of organizing or analyzing entire
clusters of associations across multiple events. Because the unit of
analysis is constant, a functioning organization, neither must students
of restructuring worry about the entity status of social units. In this
case, an organization is beset by some nonroutine pressures which serve
as a catalyst to force or compel its members to enact coping measures.
There is a single unit of analysis, one observable organization, and the
event is self-contained or circumscribed by this organization as it
moves from one potentially precarious circumstance to the next.
It could be said, with some degree of confidence, that all
organizations, disaster relevant or not, undergo some type of
restructuring if they are impacted by a natural disaster. Moreover, most
disaster relevant organizations, community based or not, become involved
in some fashion or another, with other disaster relevant organizations.
And finally, some of these organizations inexorably find themselves
caught up in processes yielding an emergent organization. Here, then, we
find not methodological dissimilarities between the three studies, but,
rather, conceptual and empirical similarities between the observables
within community responses to disaster.
These similarities may be communicated diagrammatically. For
example, for every emergent organization composed of either individuals
and organizations or solely from extant organizations, we find multiple
sources for viable dyads:

43

I

O4

EOj^

02

O3

Thus, if an emergent organization is created from event processes
between four unique organizations, then there are six empirically
demonstrable dyads:
0 X <--->

02

02

Oi < - - - >

<--->

03

03

02

03 <

0 X <--->

04

<---> O 4

>

Each of the member units within each dyad could then be analyzed in
terms of restructuring:

01 <
Rqi

> 02
or

Ro 2

It is quite possible that network linkages between two organizations
would mimic sequences of restructurings for one organization or the
other. For example, an emergent task structure (T) between 01 and 02
would be coterminous with a task (T) restructuring for both members of
the dyad.
Another possibility, which encompasses all three conceptual
landscapes and players, involves two social units in a dyadic
relationship. Over the course of processes within this dyad an emergent
organization is produced which is, in reality, a complete restructuring
of one member unit.
0} <---> 02 ---> Rq 2 : EOi
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It was observations such as these which crystallized the
methodology implemented in this research. Noting the conceptual
similarities between the empirical landscapes of the three
methodologies, it was thought that perhaps by introducing the
methodology of one study to the unique focus of analysis of another, an
enlightening partnership would be created. Put more concretely, the
question was raised: What would be the result if, say, an emergent
organization from the origins study was analyzed by the social networks
methodology (with all its special requirements, especially regarding the
code)? And what would be the outcome if organizational dyads from the
network study were reanalyzed wearing origins colored glasses?
To answer these questions required a tertiary analysis of Kreps'
secondary analysis of primary case materials obtained from both the
Disaster Research Center archives and Drabek et al. (1981). These
available data, analogous to the materials used in Kreps and Bosworth's
(1988), are described below:
Drabek's case materials deal with search and rescue
operations during the emergency periods of five natural disasters
(three tornadoes, one flood, and one volcanic eruption). His data
include the following: (1) transcribed summaries of semistructured interviews with organizational officials and unofficial
helpers that were taped recorded originally during fieldwork at
the disaster sites; (2) structured surveys which provided
background data on most of the organizations involved in search
and rescue operations; (3) newspaper clippings, meeting notes and
organizational reports; and (4) the final monograph produced from
the project (p.8).
Case materials from the Disaster Research Center (DRC) deal
with search and rescue and also a range of other response domains
(Kreps, 1985) which were enacted during the emergency period of 10
natural disasters (one earthquake, two hurricanes, three
tornadoes, and four floods). The DRC archives are largely in the
form of verbatim transcriptions of unstructured interviews with
either participants in emergent organizations or other individuals
who reported on the actions of these social units. A variety of
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related documentary information (newspapers, meeting minutes,
recorded direct observation, and after-action reports) are
available for these events as well (p.10).
A purposive sample of 19 cases (see Table 2) was drawn from the
two data files. The justification for those cases purposively selected
and analyzed follows from the sensitizing, cross-methodological strategy
alluded to above. Regarding the analysis of emergent organizations from
a networking perspective, it was

felt that this could best be

accomplished using 1) the subset of total DRC cases which were
identified according to Focal Organization Type; that is, in particular,
emergent organizations coded "7", emergent from organizations; and 2) a
subset of this subset which were thought, initially, to best represent
emergent organizations comprised from two distinct and observable social
units.
From the Drabek data file, cases were selected according to
number of elements characterizing the social network links between two
units. Here, the emphasis was not on the units themselves, but on the
conceptual puzzle dealing with why three element forms of association
failed to gain a fourth. In other words, with ostensibly similar units
as the origins studies, and across similar conditions, the network study
failed to locate a single instance of emergent organization. Therefore,
a purposive sample of 10 dyads, with three element network forms, was
selected in order to discern what conceptual outcomes would result had
these dyads been analyzed by the origins methodology. The implicit
question asked: For what reasons, empirically, conceptually, or
methodologically, did these dyads fail to achieve the status of or be
recognized as emergent organizations?
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TABLE 2: Purposive Samples of Relevant Case Materials
from the Two Data Sources
Events

Cases

Case No.

FOT*

Form

DRC DATA
1.

Flood, Fairbanks,
Alaska, 1967

1

#0014

7

RDTA

2.

Flood, Anchorage,
Alaska

1

#0033

7

RDTA

3.

Tornado, Topeka,
Kansas, 1966

2

#0172
#0187

7
7

RADT
DRTA

4.

Tornado, Belmond
Iowa, 1966

i

#0251

6

DTRA

5.

Oak Lawn Tornado,
Chicago, 111., 1967

2

#0365
#0366

7
1

DRTA
TDRA

6.

Hurricane Camille,
Gulf Coast, 1969
Subtotal

2

#0419
#0420

7
6

DRTA
RDAT

9

DRABEK DATA
7.

Tornado, Lake Pomona,
Kansas, 1978

3

#004
#005
#014

RAT
RTA
TRA

8.

Tornado, Wichita Falls,
Texas, 1979

1

#023

RAT

9.

Tornado, Cheyenne,
Wyoming, 1979

2

#055
#060

TRA
RTA

10.

Volcanic Eruption,
Mount St. Helens,
Washington, 1980

4

#095
#096
#117
#120

TDR
RTD
TDR
RTD

Subtotal 10
Total 19
* Focal Organization Type (FOT). Organizations were coded as to
whether they were:
1 -- Public Bureaucracies;
6 - - Emergent Groups of Individuals; or
7 -- Emergent Groups of other Groups or Organizations
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Three additional cases were appended later. As this study
progressed, it was judged that a more complete picture of the dynamics
of applying Kreps' code would result if instances of organization
emergent from individuals and as a result of organizational
restructuring were analyzed (cases #0251, #0420,and #0366).
The empirical and conceptual similarities between the three
studies, origins, networks and restructuring have been examined above;
as have the conceptual dissimilarities regarding the focus of analysis
explicit in each approach. Another commonality between the three
approaches obviously is Kreps' structural code. It's rather fascinating
to note that even as the code shapes and distinguishes social forms
across differing foci of analysis, so, too, do these unique foci of
analysis affect use and significance of the elements in the code. What
conceptual and theoretical properties activities (A), resources (R),
tasks (T), and domain (D) possess are altered subtly as they are applied
to uniquely divergent phenomena -- and the consequences are varied and
interesting. A presentation of some of these interesting consequences
will follow. Other issues of relevance will be addressed in the
following section such as the eccentricities of establishing viable
units for consequent dyadic formulations. Additionally, the difference
between taking a "holistic" approach to an event sequence as opposed to
either 1) focusing on single dyads within an event sequence or 2)
focusing on a single dyad across multiple event sequences will be
explored.
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FINDINGS

Consistent with the previous methods section, the Findings format
will deal first with issues related to the origins study, moving later
to a discussion of the social networks study. As before, the
restructuring methodology will receive perfunctory treatment only when
it further elucidates key points of disjuncture among the three
methodologies. The analysis will revolve, once again, around the issues
of units of analysis and foci of analysis for each methodology.
Sustained attention will be given each dimension, especially as to its
effect on the application of Kreps' code. At the conclusion of each
methodological discussion, Kreps' structural code will receive attention
on its own terms. And a final installment will attempt to summarize and
bring closure to this analysis.

Origins by Social Networks
As was stated in the Methods and Issues section, the methodology
for this study involves the application of one study's methodological
focus onto the substantive materials and conceptual outcomes of
"parallel” studies. It is important to remember, however, that the
research "subject" under observation was always some population's
response to a natural disaster. With a common subject it might seem that
the following analysis is but a tripartite snapshot, from three
different angles, the total result of which is that the object is
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observed in some detail. In fact, this was the case in applying the
network methodology to origin's case materials. Why? Namely, because the
origin's study deals with self-contained events of organizing. It
simplifies the overall response structure between diverse organizations
and individuals by focusing on only one event. With the stage set, so to
speak, and emergent organization the theme, players' (organizational
units and individuals) parts are already defined -- the script is
approved.
This overall methodological and conceptual process may be
represented by a series of concentric circles, each of which symbolizes
some empirical and conceptual aspect of the disaster environment (see
Figure 1) -- interlocking circles of analytical interest. The movement
inward presents this environment from its most inclusive level to more
specific designations. Such a configuration will serve to represent both
the essence of the origins study, as a working methodology, and the
place of organizational dyads within it. The outermost circle takes in
the entire disaster response and defines the researchable subject.
Through the interviews,observable arenas of action begin to coalesce
around various events (circle 2). Because individuals are curiously
bounded by time and space, an event merely serves to provide the
boundaries of and cognitive backdrop for the actions of these
individuals as they act, interact, and react to the effect of some
natural disaster. At some point, the actions of individuals (of various
affiliations) within this event cross some threshold of "Being" or
"Becoming" -- observability, viability, and content -- such that they
achieve entity status as emergent units. Circle 3, therefore, represents
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Figure 1: Symbolic Representation
of the Origins Methodology

1) DISASTER CONTEXT

2) SOCIAL EVENT
OF ORGANIZING

3) EMERGENT
ORGANIZATION

4) SOCIAL NETWORKING
BY PARTICIPANT UNITS

5) SINGLE
UNIT
RESTRUCTURING
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the recognition of an emergent unit, a possible emergent
organization, which then becomes the unit of analysis for the origins
methodology. Consequently, the evolutionary stages in its development
are reconstructed using Kreps' code.
This emergent organization may also be analyzed in terms of
participating units. Circle 4 represents, then, the analysis of
participant organizations, in terms of dyadic social networks, within
the context of the overall emergent unit. And the innermost circle (5)
speaks to the possibilility of analyzing existing and participating
units in terms of restructuring.
The notion of focusing on participant units is not paramount to
the origins methodology. However, because these dyads are contained
within a single event and are circumscribed by a parent, encompassing
entity, the analysis is fairly straight forward. This same illustration,
using concentric circles, will be used later to show why the analysis of
social networks by the origins methodology is much more problematic.
To illustrate the above conceptualization, an example will be
provided from the case materials involving a tornado which struck a city
in Iowa (case #0251). The following, from Brouillette's (1966) "Summary
of High Points", serves as a sensitizing description which should help
to highlight the notion of multiple events of activity:
Four phases of search and rescue: The first phase started at 2:58
when the tornado hit and lasted for about a half an hour. Search
and rescue was not organized, consisted of individuals looking for
their families and neighbors and relatives. The second phase
commenced at about a half an hour after the tornado hit. [The]
Volunteer Fire Department was in the field searching for the dead
and injured after the tornado hit. The third phase of rescue
activity started two or three hours after the tornado hit. The
Iowa Highway Patrol organized groups to search for the dead and
injured. It consisted mainly of farmers from the area, [city]
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residents not in the impact area, sheriff's department personnel,
city policemen, etc., in the surrounding area. The fourth phase of
rescue did not start until the next morning at 8 A.M. in which
uniformed police, including city police, sheriffs, and highway
patrol, were organized by [a] county sheriff and the Captain of
the [Highway] Patrol into 8 or 10 teams, consisting of 8 or 10 men
each, who systematically searched every building to check for dead
and injured. Upon successful completion of searching of each
house, the team captain would tie a tag on the outside of the
house. The tag would include the time checked, what was found, and
the team captain's signature.
Four phases of search and rescue and/or possible events of organizing
are thus identified. The search and rescue operation during the last
phase crosses the threshold of "Being” and "Becomes" the unit of
analysis as an emergent organization.
Before the description of and event depiction for this emergent
organization is presented, the following should be kept in mind. In
keeping with the illustration using the concentric circles, the origins
methodology distills single events and resultant units from the overall
disaster response. In doing so, the disaster's complex impact upon the
entire realm of social units and individuals is rendered manageable.
Additionally, by focusing on only one event and the emergent form which
comes to symbolize the structure of that event, applying the structural
code is also facilitated. The reconstruction of origins for the emergent
unit, the entity status of which is pre-established, becomes a matter of
locating structural elements which are already presumed to exist. The
important questions regarding application of the code become: When did
the emergent unit gain external legitimation? When did the emergent unit
evidence an internal division of labor? When were resources acquired or
necessary for the emergence of the unit? When were activities pursued or
enacted relative to the proposed raison d'etre for the emergent unit?

53
The code is thus employed, not in terms of the complex relations between
either social units, the individuals who represent these social units,
or discrete, unaffiliated individuals, but, rather, to characterize form
from the content of an overriding event sequence.
Returning to the Iowa scenario from above (case #0251), the
reconstruction of the stages in this emergent unit's origins, its form
at origins, was judged to be D-T-R-A. The event sequence of this
organization's emergence is as follows:
After the conclusion of the third phase of search and rescue (due
to darkness), it was jointly decided and agreed to by the Captain
of the Highway Patrol and the Sheriff of •'Proximity" county that
one more systematic, organization search would be prudent. There
was some initial conflict over who was to be in charge, however,
this was quickly resolved in favor of joint control (Domain).
During the night meetings were held focusing on how best to
conduct this last search. Itwas decided that a house to house
search would be conducted by teams of patrolmen and sheriff's. To
facilitate the comprehensive nature of the search, tags would be
placed on the front and back doors stating when it had been
searched and by whom (Domain-Tasks). These tags were secured as
were the human material necessary to conduct this search (DomainTasks-Resources). At six o'clock the next morning, a meeting was
convened which was attended by highway patrolmen, sheriffs and
deputy sheriffs from surrounding counties, and police from the
impacted city as well as other nearby towns. During this meeting
the plan was laid out, search teams of officers were established,
and soon afterward, the search was conducted accordingly. The
final phase of search and rescue took only two hours to complete
during which time some additional victims were located (DomainTasks-Resources-Activities).
Here we have one event centered around an emergent search and
rescue effort. "Search and rescue" becomes the domain of the event, and
presumably the domain for all organizations and individuals involved. If
our aim was to analyze this emergent organization in terms of social
networks, then the relationship between the Highway Patrol Department
and the "Proximity" County Sheriff's Office would stand out as our focal
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dyad. Analyzing the social networking between these two organizations,
and characterizing this network through the code, would proceed on the
basis of our dyads participation in the search and rescue venture.
Wherever or however else these organizations may have been involved
throughout the total disaster context is disregarded in favor of an
expedited search for social networks or interdependencies in regards to
this one event.
A similar example can be found in the dyadic relationship
involving a City Building and Zoning Department from a Midwestern city
and a Building Inspectors Associations serving the area (case #0365).
The event depiction is as follows:
The tornado which struck the city on Friday morning carved a three
and a half mile long avenue of destruction. Hundreds of homes and
other family dwellings were either destroyed outright or sustained
major structural damage. Recognizing the potential danger of these
unsafe structures for the inhabitants and knowing that many of
these buildings would have to be condemned, the mayor and other
city officials turned this issue over to the city Building and
Zoning Department. The mayor on Friday evening was quoted as
saying to the city Building Commissioner, "Do what you have to do,
whatever you have to do. If somebody gets in your way', run them
over, and if he gets up, I'm gonna run you over." The city
Building Commissioner, knowing that he and his staff of four could
not even begin to effectively inspect the all the damaged
buildings, decided to enlist the aid of the South Suburban
Building Officials Association (SBLC). As the only individual
legally empowered to condemn buildings and realizing the city
would soon be flooded with private contractors and insurance
claims adjustors, the Building Commissioner prepared to take
charge of what would become an extensive operation (Domain). An
agreement with members of the SBLC as a result of a previous
tornado, expedited the arrival of volunteer support -- building
commissioners and inspectors, from surrounding areas, began to
arrive the following morning (Domain-Resources). As the man in
charge, the building commissioner, made several immediate
decisions. First, to protect these "volunteers" from any legal
repercussions, they were "hired", on the spot for one dollar each
and each man was assigned official appointment cards. These
"employees" were then divided into teams each led by an inspector
handpicked by the Building Commissioner. Teams were then assigned
to certain impacted areas and told to "fan out" in order to cover
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all of the impacted area. Buildings were categorized as belonging
to one of 3 classes: a) light (or habitable buildings), b)
moderate to heavy (buildings with apparent structural damage but
still habitable in a crunch), and c) heavy to severe (buildings
which were structurally unsound and uninhabitable)(DomainResources-Tasks). Three separate inspections occurred over the
next few days until all those buildings which could not be
salvaged were condemned and eventually destroyed (DomainResources-Tasks-Activities).
Aside from the questions relating to the designation of organizational
units (e.g., is an association an organizational unit?), again, we find
a possible dyadic relationship between organizations where that
relationship is circumscribed by one event.
This case example also delineates the continuities and
discontinuities between the conceptual peculiarities of the origins,
social networks and restructuring methodologies. It must first be
affirmed that an emergent entity is generated - - a n organized entity
which was not present before the disaster. However, regarding the
participants, how best is this emergent organization analyzed? Two
important points, one from the interview data, may help answer this
question. First, we note the fact that the Building Commissioner, and
his employees, were also a members of the SBLC -- i.e., even though
there are two distinct organizational entities, these entities are
nonetheless linked by joint membership. Secondly, from a conceptual
perspective, we observe that the domain of these two entities did not
change in response to the disaster. The inspection of buildings was
their game before and after, the tornado.
Since the domain of the Building and Zoning Department did not
change, and thus the activities were an extension of predisaster
activities, are we "merely" dealing with an organization which had to
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expand or extend its structure and process to accomplish the task at
hand?4 In other words, is this episode actually an example of
restructuring of an existing organization, prompted by a disaster
catalyst and altered by an influx of human resources? Or should this
episode more rightly be construed as the culmination of social
networking processes, processes which antedate the disaster?
In a later episode (Case #0366), involved in this same disaster
scenario, we find the Building Commissioner, representing either the
emergent organization or his predisaster status, requesting the city
fire department to perform a function quite distinct from their
predisaster domain. In this event sequence, the fire department is asked
to expedite the demolition of condemned buildings by a systematic
evacuation and burning of each building. In this case, obviously the
fire department is undergoing a radical restructuring, especially in
regards to its domain. However, are not there also elements of social
networking involved? And what of an emergent organizational entity
encapsulating both the condemnation of buildings by the Building
Commissioner and the removal of these buildings by the fire department?
It is here that we confront the first instance of multiple and
connected events involving two or more organizations. Depending on the
scope of one's holistic view of the disaster activity, event portrayals
may change drastically or in more subtle ways. The origins method takes
on the entire disaster response one event at a time. The social
networking and restructuring methodologies follow focal units over
indefinite periods of time and across many and unique events.
Furthermore, while the origins study does in fact uncover instances of
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organization where they did not exist previously, many times this
designation of "organization" is not synonymous with "entity". It may
merely describe and embody the essence of the observed activities. The
actual entity may more closely be represented by a restructuring
organization or a social network.

Organized States and Activities
One other observation, this time related to the conceptual
significance of patterns of the elements, should be made. Regarding the
two events or organizing depictions above (cases #0251 and #0365), the
reader may note the initial appearance, in various sequences, of the
elements domain (D), tasks (T), and resources (R). For example,
regarding the social network involving the Highway Patrol and the
"Proximity" County Sheriff's Department (case #0251), the reader will
note that it was this dyad which secured the first three elements (D-TR ) . And this much prior to the enactment of activities (A) -- the
remaining element for organization to exist.
Empirically, it is interesting to note that during the night
preceding the actual search and rescue, actions occurring between the
individuals representing the Highway Patrol and the Sheriff's Department
appear to have manufactured an organized state. And not until search and
rescue operations commenced, that is, only after activities (A) related
to the emergent domain (D) and task structure (T) ensued, did this
organized state cross the threshold to organization. The same example
could be made from the Midwestern building inspector's operation (case
#0365).
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It might be asked, what of the actions between these individuals
which created such a state of near organization? Are these actions
important to the event of organizing, and if they are, how should they
be viewed? Are these actions not activities (A) in the same sense as
actions related to search and rescue? For the origins methodology, these
questions are not of paramount importance. Activities (A) relate to the
overall event of organizing. Therefore, rather than make an issue of
actions between participants, this approach simply asks, did the
emerging organization enact activities (A) relevant to its professed
domain (search and rescue)?
We might even go so far as stating that activities (A), in the
origin's study correspond with the notion of actions which actually "do”
something -- e.g., searching houses, driving ambulances, pulling bodies
from the wreckage. There is no corresponding distinction made for those
actions between individuals who are actually involved in planning,
coordinating or controlling the course of the emergent effort. In this
sense, we seem to have a dichotomy between what may be termed "whitecollar" activities, or activities related to organizing which do not
actually "do" anything, and "blue-collar" activities or activities which
do not relate to organizing, but which actually "do" something.
The important point to be made here is that activities (A)
recapitulate the nature of the overall event of organizing -- i.e., for
what reason did the emergent organization come into being and did it
conduct activities related to this purpose? Methodologically, then, in
terms of applying the elements, if activities (A) follow the designation
of either domain (D) or task (T) then ensuing actions are focused and
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defined by either: 1) the domain of the event (the principal sphere of
activities defining the event) or 2) the structure of the division of
labor. Regarding Domain-Activities, the relevant question becomes: Were
actions undertaken which conformed to the professed domain (D) or did
the- emerging organization do what it set out to do? Regarding TasksActivities, the important question is: Did the organization do what it
set out to do, according to the explicit or implicit task structure?5
Still regarding the conceptual notion of an "organized state"
which must "wait" for activities (A) to

ensue before emergence is

complete, we note the obverse of such a

scenario as the situation where

the domain (D), external legitimation for an emerging organization, is
problematic or not forthcoming. In this

case, three elements, tasks

(T),

resources (R) and activities (A) may be

noted in an event sequence, but

the unit, as emergent entity or social network, is cannot be afforded
entity status because, as yet, there is no external legitimation.
Nevertheless, T-A or A-T (or in some way combined with resources (R)),
provided this configuration corresponds to a singular event, could be
said to represent not an "organized state", but "organized activity"
(see Figure 2). Here activities (A) are defined and patterned by virtue
of a division of labor and are, in a sense, "organized". There are many
examples of this phenomenon in the social networking case materials.
Another important aspect, relative to the origins methodology,
deals with the temporal aspect of organizing -- especially in regards to
any organizational form composed initially of domain (D), tasks (T), and
resources (R) - - i n whatever order. For example, the D-R-T pattern at
origins for the building inspector's operation (the emergent
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Figure 2: The Relationship Between
Organized States, Activities, and Entities
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organization cited in case #0365) deals with a relatively short period
of time in relation to the total life span of this organization -- that
being, approximately one week. The activities (A) which completed the
requirement for organization, essentially, then, could be viewed as
"covering" the extent of that week's activities.
This observation warrants two further points: 1) In the origins
methodology, every attempt is made to reconstruct the origins of an
emergent organization in terms of a logical evolutionary pattern; that
is, temporal continuity between the elements is of utmost importance.
Furthermore, 2) whether the actual origins process takes four hours or
four days, the methodological end result is supposed to yield a
taxonomic portrait of some emergent entity. The conceptual importance of
"entity" status should not be taken lightly. For instance, if an overall
unit (composed of organizations or individuals) indeed achieves the same
entity status as pre-existent organizations, then this emergent
organization assumes a place in the environment of other organizations.
It may then be analyzed in terms of dyadic (triadic and so on) social
networks or in terms of organizational restructuring.
A truly fascinating example of the emergence of a viable and
important new entity on the scene occurred in Alaska during an
especially troublesome flood (case #0014). Here, individuals heralding
from various organizations instigated a program called Kid-E-Vac, which
evacuated children by plane from Anchorage to Fairbanks. These children
were not necessarily in danger, but the program served to remove the
burden of child care from families whose homes or businesses were
destroyed. The origins sequence for Kid-E-Vac took a little over two

62
days (R-D-T), while the program was solvent for over a month (A). During
this month, there are myriad examples of other organizations responding
to and affirming Kid-E-Vac's mission and equally numerous examples of
Kid-E-Vac having to respond to other organization's dictates -- evidence
of emergent social networks and single organizational restructuring,
respectively.
To recapitulate the crux of the issues above:
a.) The origins methodological approach distills the complex
array of intersecting events and social networks down to one
overall event.
b.) From this event, a unit (composed of various
participants) is flushed out as having unambiguously passed
a threshold of "Being".
c.) The stages in this
reconstructed yielding
emergent unit, and yet
a population of extant

emergent unit's origins are then
both an evolutionary depiction of an
one more organizational entity among
organizations.

d.) If the overall event and resultant emergent unit remain
the focus of analysis, then analyzing organizational dyads
"lifted" from this scenario should not be problematic.
Furthermore, if an emergent organization is located that is
a result of some dyadic social network, then the unit of
analysis is identical for either study. Should this dyad,
analyzed in terms of the social network's use of the code,
not yield organization, then it may only be assumed that
this anomaly is to be explained by divergent uses of the
code by the two methodologies.

Origins and the Application of the Code
Threshold criteria for applying the elements of the code are
structured by the focus and units of analysis employed in any given
study. In the origins study, methodological decisions regarding the code
are based specifically on event processes, and applied according to the
evident organizing character of an emergent unit. Because this emergent
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unit has already crossed a threshold of "being", processes between
discrete individuals and/or organizations are not at issue. Thus,
threshold criteria regarding the presence or absence of the elements are
based on their perspective conceptual and theoretical properties alone.
The network methodology, as will be shown, must implement thresholds for
the elements which mirror, yet also in some ways transcend the
theoretical properties of each element. In this section, the application
of the code by the restructuring study will also be included; namely due
to the close conceptual relationship between the origins approach and
restructuring.
Domain
As an elemental stage in origins, domain (D) incorporates several
important distinctions. By definition, domain (D) symbolizes external
recognition of and legitimacy for an emergent unit and what it is doing.
On the surface, this definition seems to apply to one overriding
phenomenon -- the external legitimation of some emergent entity.
However, there are additional dynamics and properties to this
designation, not necessarily covered by the generic formulation. For
instance, on one level, we know that domain (D) is applied in accordance
with the activities of some unit. These activities can be amalgamated by
categories which describe specifiable spheres of activities -- i.e.,
legitimation is granted by virtue of the domain of the unit. The
application of domain (D), then, in this case, identifies some entity
from content of its activities (A).
Domain

domain <-

activities
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On another level, domain (D) confronts both the issue of entity status
for emergent units and the notion of structural hierarchies. Both of
these issues will be discussed below.
In reality, external legitimation usually comes on the heels of
the recognition that a unit is (or will be) performing a service,
function, whatever, which is considered of some importance relative to
the community's "needs". Distinct spheres of these relevant activities
(domains), may denote both distinct populations of units (e.g., law
enforcement agencies, fire departments) or unique units such as KID-EVAC. In either case, the relationship of domain (D), domain, and
activities is such that only certain types of activities are recognized
as cogent domains, and only these domains or activities would seem to be
legitimated by external sources. An analogy was drawn previously
representing a dichotomy between "white-collar" activities and "bluecollar" activities -- "blue-collar" activities symbolize important
domains, and provide the observer with the necessary information to
decide what a unit is doing; "white-collar" activities do not
necessarily define what the unit is doing, but they are a critical
component of organizing. An interesting point here corresponds to the
situation where domain (D) legitimation comes early for an emergent unit
(first or second element in origins). Legitimation, in other words, is
granted a unit before the actual execution of unit related activities.
In this sense, while "white-collar" activities are almost never
considered activities (A) and may not correspond with any cogent domain
type, they most certainly have a lot to do with external legitimation.
A second contingency related to the methodological recognition of

domain (D) concerns both the type or kind of activities and the
relationship of participants within the emergent unit to these
activities. Regarding types of activities, another dichotomy was
provided by one interviewee: some things can be done by any "Joe” off
the street, while other areas require a certain amount of expertise. In
an example above (case #0365), involving the Building Inspector (the
interviewee), we find an activity type, the inspection of damaged
buildings, which hot anyone could accomplish with any degree of
confidence. As the external source of legitimation, the mayor tells the
building inspector to "do what you gotta do to get the job done". At
this point, there is no emergent unit in existence to be legitimated;
therefore, we could be looking at a reaffirmation of legitimation (for
an existing branch of city government) which was never lost. Other
domains of activity, such as search and rescue, do not immediately begin
with legitimation, thus the autonomy and organizational viability of
this operation is up for grabs.
This also points to the importance of the relationship between an
organization's pre- and post-disaster activity spheres (or domains), as
this impacts both the emergent unit and the conceptual significance of
domain (D). In Case #0187, two newspaper publishers, from different
cities, are viewed as comprising an emergent organization (D-R-T-A)
after one publishing house was shut down due to the malevolent presence
of a tornado. From this example, no source of legitimation external to
this dyad was given. It could be said none was needed. The newspaper
publishers were not attempting to inhabit some unique domain, they were
doing what newspaper publishers do -- publishing a newspaper. Here
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again, we find a monopoly of expertise or function, the activity of
which does not seem to need any external source of legitimation to
continue.
Another example of event activities to which domain (D) is
applied, not necessarily related to the above points, involves Case
#0251 (i.e., the Iowa search and rescue operation noted above). Domain
(D) was established by virtue of the fact that the scuffling for
authority of this operation (between the Highway Patrol and the
Sheriff's Office) was resolved in favor of joint authority -- i.e., the
operation's legitimacy was questionable up until the time the authority
structure was solidified. A further example of domain (D) use comes from
the restructuring methodology, where one organizational unit is the
object of inquiry. For this use, domain (D) is in evidence if and when
that unit changes its domain (dominant sphere of activities) as a result
of some compelling catalyst.
This brings us to the significance of domain (D) in establishing
entity status for emergent units. There are multiple examples, two noted
above, where external legitimation is granted prior to the formation of
an emergent unit. It is here that the intriguing interplay between
activities and domains of existing organization and the methodological
outcomes of applying domain (D) comes into play. For example, in the
case involving the newspaper publishers, no new entity was legitimated.
And as regards the legitimation of organizational activities, there was
never any conflict or question that these organizations were legitimated
in what they were doing. The questionable nature or, indeed, need for
domain (D) here, may merely represent the prospect of shifting the focus
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from origins to restructuring -- i.e., how did these two newspaper
publishers restructure to deal with disaster demands. For the Illinois
example (case #0365), however we might want to question the necessity of
external legitimation for an existing branch of city government, the
constituent units of this encompassing emergent unit (the Building and
Zoning Office and the Building Inspectors Association) did merge to form
an entity which was not there prior to the tornado. This legitimation
occurred while the emergent unit, which appeared later on, was still
just a gleam in the Building Commissioner's eye. And while these
organizational units were obviously in the process of restructuring,
they also restructured in such a way that a new, unique entity hit the
stage.
So what does this say about the conceptual outcomes of the
methodological application of domain (D)? It seems to say that not every
case where domain (D) is documented is representative of the same
phenomenon. In sum, while the origins methodology, concentrates on
domain (D) legitimation for the event in toto, by focusing on
participants within that event and their relationship to observable
activities (i.e., by fine tuning the focus on content), one may bring
into question the necessity or legitimacy of domain (D) for some units.
Furthermore, entity status for emergent units is not uniformly
represented by either the methodological notation of domain (D) or
empirical realities. As a process in the stages of organization, the
significance of domain (D) cannot be ignored; however, as a generic
descriptor of form, describing the content of myriad, unique organizing
sequences, domain (D) conceptually seems to flit between the notion of
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external legitimation (for activities or units) and an objective
criterion for entity status.
Tasks
In regarding task (T), the question for the origins methodology
is: did the event sequence or emergent unit within this sequence
evidence a division of labor which facilitated its activities? Unique or
portentous phenomena regarding the logistics of this task structures
creation (who created it and who implemented it) are unimportant to this
designation. Tasks (T), like domain (D), does not uniformly describe
some empirical reality. Depending on event circumstances, a task
structure (T) may relate either to the working out of a chain of command
(i.e., an emergent authority structure) or the working out of patterns
of performance (i.e., an emergent activity structure).
In the restructuring methodology, a change in task (T) usually
denotes some change in patterns of activities -- however significant or
otherwise this change may be. Moreover, the observation of a change in
tasks (T), for existing organizational units, does not necessarily mean
that a complete reconstitution of the prevailing division of labor has
occurred. For this reason, tasks (T), as applied by the restructuring
methodology, more often than not, corresponds to a change in some
subsystem of activities within the context of the overall organizational
division of labor (predominant authority and activity structures).
Resource
As the origins methodology describes the emergence of some budding
entity, resource (R), in this case, does not always imply a transfer
from one unit to another. The important phrase here is "key resources at
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origins"; that is, resource (R) applies to the crucial influx of some
resource for a burgeoning disaster relevant effort. When resource (R)
begins the origins sequence, what we usually find is that some physical
resource (e.g., a building) or ongoing activities, become the
centerpiece for the emergent unit whose origin is to be analyzed. This
resource (R) does not have to be offered, it is, in a manner of
speaking, coopted by the emergent unit. For example, Kid-E-Vac (from
case #0014) was initiated through and enabled by the ongoing evacuation
efforts conducted by the Air National Guard. On the flip side, like
activities (A), if resources (R) follows either domain (D) or task (T),
then its import is defined and shaped by the dictates of either the
realization of the predominant sphere of activities or an emergent
division of labor.
Resources (R), nonetheless, are significant in the origins
methodology in that they do not "merely" imply a social network, but the
possibility of an emergent unit. This is quite a different formulation
from the restructuring or networking methodologies for which resource
(R) specifies a transfer of human or nonhuman material from one
established unit to another
-- to be used in some unspecified fashion. It is also different in that,
contrary to the network and restructuring methods, one and only one
occasion of resources (R) is important.
This point, however, does not lessen the element's sometimes "grab
bag" quality. With such a broad range of possible "things" that can be
considered resources (R), the "problem" is finding just where their
appearance is most beneficial or significant to the emergent
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organization. For this reason, while its relative significance for
organization is undeniable, organization, as a taxonomic construct, will
seemingly never suffer for lack of resources (R).
Activities
The origins methodological treatment of activities (A) has been
given sustained attention in the section above.
The specification of a change of activities (A), for the
restructuring methodology, incorporates a wide variety of organizational
actions. While the methodological criteria for documenting a change in
activities are not stated explicitly, some "catalyst” , in all cases,
precipitates this designation. Given the broad interpretation here, most
instances of organizational restructuring involve some change in the
pattern, types, or nature of organizational activity.
Overall, the restructuring methodology implements the least
demanding criteria for application of the code. Restructuring, as a
process, corresponds to self-contained organizational unit processes
and, therefore, potential involvement within an emergent organization
and/or social networks within a population of organizations are not at
issue. For this reason, for instance, restructuring of domain (D) is
more in line with a change in domain -- that is, the taking on of
functions not related to predisaster activities -- and, hence, external
legitimation is not necessarily a prerequisite. And activities (A)
relate to everything the organization does in response to either some
catalyst, a change in domain (D), an altered task structure (T), or some
infusion of resources (R) -- whichever the case may be.
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Social Networks by Origins
Most social networks analyzed by the corresponding study did not
culminate in or constitute "organization" -- this even though all
organizations emerge from social networks of persons and other social
units (Kreps and Bosworth, 1988:3). It is only through a holistic
approach to social phenomena, that is, as Warriner (1988) points out, by
viewing social structure in terms of constituent systemic processes,
that social networks are understood as important building blocks of more
inclusive forms. In this vein, social networks between individuals and
social units are seen as fulfilling necessary and interdependent roles
for the viability of the whole. In the social network study, the
conception and methodology employed by Kreps et al. excludes the
holistic approach; i.e., that approach which identifies encompassing
systems or units before analysis (re the origins study).
The intent rather is to pin down types and degrees of
interdependence established by social units as they attempt,
hypothetically, to reconstitute "systems" damaged by disaster effects.
According to Kreps (and Bosworth, 1988), a preliminary measure of
interdependence is as follows: the greater the number of elements
present in a social network, the greater the evidence of organization in
progress. Once again, however, it needs to be stressed that in the
social network study, systems or emergent units are not acknowledged
prior to analysis. The impetus for this decision is based, in part, on
Thompson's formulation of interdependence:
Thompson argues that pooled interdependence is its most basic
form, lest there be no organization at all. Here discrete
components of a more encompassing entity--e.g., separate branches
of a large corporation--depend on and contribute to the viability
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of the whole, but their interdependence involves neither the
movement of resources nor the direct flow of communication between
them. If neither component is dependent on or supports the other
in any direct way, how can this structural form be pinned down as
unique from all others. I suspect it cannot with Thompson's
approach because he assumes the existence of organization (for me
the co-presence of domains, tasks, resources, and activities)
before specifying possible types of interdependence (Kreps and
Bosworth, 1988:8).
Another reviewer might state, it is precisely because Thompson assumes
organization that he is able to speak of pooled interdependence. In
other words, when one inquires of kinds and degrees of interdependence,
the question seems to be interdependence of individuals or social units
in relation to what? The "what” in the network study, is undefined and
so the analysis proceeds on the basis an exhaustive list of
organizational participants which are then paired to thus represent all
possible social networks gleaned from the entire disaster response
environment.
From the origins section above, we note that analyzing social
networks, in terms of emergent organizational units -- that is, once the
event and the emergent unit are given -- is not particularly unique nor
difficult. However, the network study employs a methodology which
radically changes the conceptual and empirical environment of
organizational dyads. The "unit" is no longer a predefined emergent
entity, but one of many existing organizations which are involved in
multiple social networks. The role of individuals in regards to these
organizational units is now necessarily important. And, furthermore,
social networking between organizational units is no longer
circumscribed by one event but by the total disaster response.
Using the same illustration of interlocking spheres of analytical
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interest, we find in the network study that the outermost circle does
not begin with events, but with one particular organizational dyad. This
dyad is then analyzed across events -- circles 2 and 3. Sometimes these
events in which our dyad participates are discrete; that is, they occur
across divergent time periods. Our dyad, for example, may be involved,
initially, in a predisaster contingency plan; after the disaster, in a
conjoint search and rescue venture; and sometime later in some organized
effort to care for victims, rebuild the community, and so on. This would
constitute a temporal evolution of network commitments. A clear cut
temporal sequence between events is sometimes difficult to ascertain.
Member units may be conjointly involved in multiple events which occur
at nearly the same time. In this case, individuals representing both our
organizational units, interact in divergent spheres of event activity.
As in the origins perspective, these events exhibit properties which can
be described on their own terms. In this way, there may be instances
where separate events, involving event processes between the individual
representatives from our dyad, may overlap; in this way, yielding
additional networking dynamics -- circles 4 and 5. Circle 6 symbolizes
the fact that the organizational dyad is analyzed in terms of the
overall network of disaster responses.
A case example will be provided below to help illustrate
the points made above and also explain the significance of employing a
dyad as unit of analysis rather than an emergent unit from one
encompassing event. Prior to this event description, however, this
analysis will address issues critical for the network methodology such
as: What constitutes an organizational unit (or dyad member)? How do the
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Figure 3: Symbolic Representation of the
Social Network Methodology
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actions and positions of individuals with an organization affect the
analysis? What are the consequences of dealing with multiple events? And
what of emergent organization?
Additionally, regarding use of the code to characterize the social
networks between units, since dyadic relationships are now the unit of
analysis, analytical questions regarding application of the code are
altered: The questions originally prefaced by, "did the emergent
unit.

. .

now ask:

Does the social network involve conjoined action (Activities)?
Does the social network evidence a mobilization of human and
material resources (Resources)? Does the social network have a
division of labor that is agreed to by member units (Tasks)? Are
the units identified and legitimated externally as parts of a more
inclusive entity (Domains)? (Kreps, 1988b:3)
First, however, we should address issues which are the conceptual
"stepping stones" for the network study.

Organizational Units
As the unit of analysis is now organizational dyads, how are
member units for possible dyadic networks selected? For the network
study, a list of organizational units was provided though Drabek's
research. These organizations were mainly public or private
bureaucracies,

which spanned the continuum from local to federal

jurisdictions.

Still the question remains: What types of entities may

constitute organizational units? Is the criterion one
formalization,

of size,

relevancy, or convention? Depending on the size of the

impacted community or the relative impact magnitude of the disaster, the
analysis will deal with potential organizational units which display
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varying degrees of formalization, size and importance -- e.g., the
tremendous devastation of the hurricane which struck the small coastal
town in Mississippi (case #0420), impacted relatively small and somewhat
informal units, while the eruption of Mount Saint Helens, even though
distant from heavily populated areas, enlisted the aid of organizational
units ranging from county sheriff's offices to the 6th Army.
What empirical properties must be in evidence for an organization,
the thing, to be pronounced unambiguously there? If the criteria were
sheer numbers of paid organizational employees, say, three or more,
then, from Drabek's study we would lose many of the Civil Defense
Departments, the Risk Management Departments, some volunteer fire
departments, and many private voluntary associations. What if the
criteria were sheer numbers of participants overall -- again, three or
more? This may enlighten us as far as an objective, empirical criterion
for organizational units in general -- i.e., the greater the numbers of
organizational members, the greater the likelihood of high degrees of
formalization and recognition within a population of organization. This
criterion, nevertheless, may identify units overall, which never had
more than a tangential role in the encompassing disaster response. Even
though an organization may have thousands of members state-wide, only
two may have actually been involved. Size, in other words, remains a
contextually bounded criterion. And, finally, what about an
organization's degree of formalization as a criterion for unit status?
Again, many units from Drabek's list wouldn't pass even the most nominal
threshold of formalization.
Regarding organizations, as entities, and distilling properties
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from Kreps' code, we may say that these entities possess and implement
some specifiable division of labor which delineates power and
performance between members. An organization can be acted upon and/or
reacted to. In this environmental vein, it processes inputs and
manufactures outputs in (and of) one fashion or another. Maybe the key
to ascertaining viable organizational units for analysis, in any
disaster context, revolves around 1) entities which do something
relative to the disaster demands, and 2) entities which are acted upon
and reacted to -- in other words, entities which are recognized by
participants as contributing to or facilitating postdisaster activities.
This would seem to be very close to a criteria of "naming"; i.e.,
organizational units are there because participants specify them by name
and by what they did.
These criteria would seem to represent rather ephemeral
distinctions; however, distinctive disasters befalling communities of
various sizes will elicit the response of quite a range of
organizations. Small impacted communities will response with small units
who may otherwise not cross any empirical threshold of power, size, or
formalization. So in this sense the criteria are sound. On another
front, in spite of the above, the criteria biases interpretation in
favor of traditional distinctions of organizational entities. In other
words, certain city, county, state and federal agencies or
bureaucracies, such as police and fire departments, highway patrol and
national guard will always constitute organizations, regardless of
involvement. Equally, private bureaucracies are seldom viewed as
anything other than organizations. But what about relatively unknown
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voluntary associations and groups? What of city councils and boards of
aldermen? Many times constituent units of city government are elicited
as organizational units (e.g., public works and traffic), while certain
other very important positions within a city's governmental structure,
such as the mayor's office or the attorney's office, are not. The irony,
here, of course, is that even as the origins and network studies analyze
"organization", the thing and process, deciding what entities should be
involved in the analysis remains somewhat obscure. The question of
organizational units, which cries out for some type of threshold
criteria, continues to be circumstantial and contextually bound.

Organizational Units and Individuals
In general, the larger the size of organizations, the less aware
we become about the extent of individual member's activities or
organizational involvement. In this regard, through the interviews one
never becomes fully cognizant of the actions of all the members of any
organizational unit; and it really isn't imperative that we know.
Nevertheless, if we are concentrating on social networks among
organizations, it is important to know something of where and how
organizational members are interacting. It still might be wondered: What
is the conceptual importance of the individual to the organizational
unit? If members are specified, don't their actions correspond in exact
terms to organizational actions? The answer is yes and no.
Analyzing an individual's relationship to an organizational unit
is important for several reasons. At least on one level, it is true
that: 1) many times individuals may have organizational affiliations and
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yet their disaster-relevant actions are not construed validly as
"organizational actions"; 2) individuals may have similar organizational
affiliations and yet not possess the same authority ranking or power
within that organization; and 3) organizational members are oftentimes
scattered across the disaster playing field; relative degrees of power
may influence their impact on the overall social network between
organizations.
First, it seems we should confront the issue which asks: When are
an individual's activities synonymous with organizational activities? It
should not be assumed that the actions of individuals always correspond
to and should be associated with the organization with which they are
affiliated. There are multiple examples which have shown this to be a
premature conclusion. For example, referring back to the Mississippi
town and its emergent EOC (case #0420), we find the head of the nearby
NASA testing facility, whose actions are not synonymous with NASA as an
organizational unit.
There are at least three possibilities describing the relatedness
of individual action and organizational action: 1) no relation -discrete individuals have no organizational affiliations relevant to
their actions; 2) related by association -- individuals are associated
with organizations (may even wield resources from that organization),
but their actions are nevertheless considered as distinct from their
parent organization; and 3) interrelatedness -- individuals who
represent organizational units such that their actions are synonymous
with organizational actions.
Because we are dealing with two "entities", the individual and the
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unit (an organization), structurally, through dyadic relationships, we
may note three possibilities: an individual's relationship with another
individual (I1 —
(Ix —

I2) ; an individual's relationship to a unit

Uj_) ; or a unit's relationship with another unit (Ux —

U2) . The

second example is important in the network study only if conceived in a
slightly obtuse fashion; namely, an individual's relationship with a
unit as this relationship corresponds with and bears upon a second
distinct unit:
I, < - - - > U,

U2
And furthermore, an individual's relationship with a unit as this
relationship corresponds with and bears upon another individual and his
relationship with a unit:

h

s
•
I------► R d ^ O i )

i2
»
I
--- R(I2:02)«----- ;

Ih

Ui

Even as we seek to avoid bestowing epistemological primacy upon
the individual or the unit, one can see how both the individual and unit
combine to relay the complexity of even a single organizational dyad.
For example, in the statements, "Two organizations worked together.
or "A task structure was
is really being conveyed

arranged between two organizations. .
is some combination of I1

two different levels of R C I ^ C ^ )

what

I2 and U x --- U2;

R(I^:02). This arrangement may be

described as: some social relationship between an individual
such that the actions of

. .11

and a unit

this individual, in such and such a case, are

indistinguishable from those of the unit -- and vice versa.
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In conclusion, organizational identities and activities are
empirically located through the activities of individuals. In some
cases, individual actions are synonymous with organizational actions; in
others situations, they are not. Furthermore, single actors may play
different roles across different situations such that her/his
organizational affiliations may only apply to one event out of many.
Once organizational affiliations are validated, there is still the
matter of an actor's role(s) within the organizational unit. There are
multiple dynamics to this formulation. For example, in the case of the
man from NASA (from Case #0420 involving the gulf coast hurricane), his
relationship to his parent organization was such that he was able to
secure needed resources for the community. However, his relationship to
NASA did not prompt his much needed arrival in the beleaguered coastal
town, rather the fact that he lived there hurried his decision. Another
example: The building inspector from Case #0365 was a member of both the
City's Building and Zoning Department and the South Suburban Building
Officials Association. Therefore, we could say that this individual's
relationship to these organizations was such that he not only could
secured needed manpower, but could also develop a Task structure between
them and secure external legitimation for his efforts.
Exact numbers of members of organizational units also play a role
in analyzing social networks. If an organization, such as the Office of
Civil Defense, has only two members, it may be easier to ascertain
whether or not their activities represent the activities of their parent
organization. The power and influence of the Office of Civil Defense in
a disaster response may also affect the nature of member's activities.
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Taking an organization, such as the National Guard, however, the
empirical location of two representatives would be hard to come by.
Additionally, again using the National Guard as example, depending on
the role of these two individuals in the overall organizational
structure (i.e., whether they are Generals or Privates), their actions
may either impact the organization as a whole, or "merely" represent it
in one of many events of relevant activities. The important point
overall is that social networks are located empirically by
organizational member's activities. The nature of their role within the
organization, and consequent actions, can substantially affect the
characterization of the social network overall.

Multiple Events
From interviews, we know that organizations can be involved,
simultaneously, in actions which range from complete control of disaster
activities to the manning of roadblocks. Across these situations, it
must be ascertained where the actions of individuals representing
organizations A and B intersected in time and space. And from these
intersecting lines of action, social networks or rather degrees of
interdependence are characterized by the code. These collisions of
organizational personnel and activity, may specify important events
which link organizations overall -- in some cases, even to the extent
that one organization merges with another; on the other hand, they may
signify nothing more than a one-time transfer of resources.
Within these event responses, it must be observed who was there to
represent these organizations and, finally, what happened? Moreover, did
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the actions occurring within one event, come to affect another event? It
is because organizational networks are observed across multiple events
that no emergent unit may be defined prior to analysis. Therefore, the
emphasis here is not on emergent organization, although this possibility
is hot excluded, but rather on degrees of interdependence between these
two units as they interact across the entire spectrum of disaster
events. This depth of interdependence is distilled from the sum total of
social networking bonds between organizational units; however, this
"distillation” process may lead to characterizations which are
methodologically rather than empirically driven. The notion of
interdependence is addressed, fully, in what follows.
The disaster event described below will be used to analyze the
complexity of dealing with multiple events. The disaster scenario
involves a tornado which struck the city of Wichita Falls; the
organizational dyad is comprised by the Wichita Falls Police Department
and the Wichita Falls Traffic Department (case #023:). From the network
study, the social networking pattern was judged to be R-A-T.
The tornado (some eyewitnesses claimed to see two or three
fully formed funnels) which struck Wichita Falls on Tuesday, April
10, carved a mile wide swath of destruction along a 10 mile path.
Three thousand houses and 140 mobile homes were completely
destroyed; one thousand addition homes received major structural
damage, and 1,300 apartment units were blown away (Drabek
1981:95). While emergency relevant agencies responded even before
the tornado left town, most of the search and rescue work was
initially performed by concerned, "unofficial” citizens.
According to Civil Defense planning, city agencies were to
report to the police department in order to set up an Emergency
Operations Center - - a decision-making body composed of
representatives from various city agencies: fire, police, civil
defense, city manager's office, traffic engineering, and public
works. This EOC became a focal point for the control of the citywide response and the coordination of resources and "peoplepower"
which began to arrive in droves. The Director of City Traffic was
initially assigned to coordinate transportation within the city,
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to set up means by which the emergency vehicles could get into the
disaster area, and to arrange transportation for the search and
rescue teams to get into the area.
Meanwhile, in the impact area a Captain from the police
department had begun to set up a command center to coordinate and
control search and rescue efforts. Hundreds of concerned
individuals, some from relevant agencies (e.g., volunteer fire
departments) and others residents, converged at the Safeway
parking lot command center. The Captain was in charge overall and
began to organize teams of these individuals to search through the
wreckage.
Hours later, back at the EOC, the CD Director noted that
their overall plan failed to designate one set organization to be
in charge of search and rescue. He then appointed the Director of
City Traffic to be in charge, "by virtue of his prior training in
the military, and the fact that he was in charge of
transportation. . .". It was then his job to shuffle personnel out
to the command posts in the field. The command posts would then
make the decision how to best use these personnel and what areas
they were to search.
According to the police Captain at the
search and rescue command center: "His contact with the EOC was
for resources only. He was in charge of making all the decisions
at the command posts, and he was the top person in charge. . . .
He also set up a temporary morgue behind the posts. It had a
medical examiner and flight surgeon check on bodies. So therefore
you could say, his organization began search and rescue activities
right after the tornado hit. He mentioned that the EOC in Police
Headquarters wanted him to make another search by Wednesday, and
another one and another one to make sure that they got everyone,
because no one could believe there was only 44 dead. But he knew
that they did a good search, a thorough search on Tuesday, and he
felt that this was a bit unnecessary."
From the origins perspective, we would note initially the selfcontained nature of event processes within both the EOC and the search
and rescue command center. In terms of organization, these events both
register an internal task structure, the presence of key resources,
activities related to their prospective domains, and the hint at
external legitimation. In other words, the encompassing system or unit
is definable and therefore, interdependence of constituent units is
interpreted on the basis of this emergent organization.

The network study, too, must analyze dyadic relations across these
two events, but information gleaned in terms of origins is, in the main,
disregarded. Here, the problem becomes one of extracting relevant
actions by organizational participants, from both these events, in terms
of organizational networks. Thus, from the EOC (Event2) , an initial
resource (R) link is documented as the police department headquarters
serves as facility for those organizations involved in the EOC including
the Traffic Department. As with most event portrayals of EOC's, it's
difficult to fathom the extent and nature of the activities which
participants engaged in at this location. What of conjoined activities?
We might speculate that members from these two organizations were, at
some point, working together under the domain of coordination and
control through the emergent unit named the EOC; this, however, is not
documented due to the fact that the predominant disaster-related
activities of the organizations are judged to revolve around search and
rescue, not coordination and control. Therefore, organizational
activities at the EOC become negligible, methodologically and
empirically.

We do know, however, that several hours after impact, the

head of the City Traffic Department was placed in charge of search and
rescue efforts (T):
' Event 1 \(EOC)

/

/
'

\
\

R-T
/Police <-> Traffics
/
\
From the network study, it is noted that conjoined activities (A),
activities conducted at the same time, in the same place, are
transpiring between members of the Traffic Department and the Police
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Department at the command center. The complete affair is underwritten by
the police department in conjunction with other participating units such
as various fire departments, volunteer and otherwise, in the surrounding
area; it is, in essence, a police operation. The EOC, at this point,
serves as a clearinghouse, in terms of resources, for the command
center.
, Evento s(SAR command)
\

'

/

\
\

A
/Police <-> Traffic'
/

'

At which time the head of the Traffic Department is placed in charge of
search and rescue overall, the focus of these resource transfers shifts
from the EOC, as an entity, to the Traffic Department. Therefore, these
two events becomes linked by virtue of the decision to place the Traffic
Department in charge of search and rescue. This may be illustrated in
the following fashion:
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Now all the pieces of the puzzle are in place and the true
complexity of the network study is revealed in various ways.
Empirically, it is altogether possible that in some cases the extent of
organizational action will not surface through the interview data. Even
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if complete information regarding a dyad were attainable, conceptual
issues would remain. For one thing, in the network methodology, patterns
of interdependence are fathomed across and between events which span an
unpredictable amount of time. In the case above, elements characterize
different and distinct phases within certain events which result in
recurring element depictions. In other words, there may be multiple task
structures (T), resource transfers (R), or incidences of conjoined
activities (A) across events and/or the entire length of the disaster
response. Nevertheless, those first empirical network ties which bind
the two organizations (those characterized by the elements), continue to
serve as the conceptual characterization of the social network for the
duration of the response -- this even though there may be no event
continuity, that is, no temporal and substantive continuity between what
the elements symbolize empirically.
Another point might be made in regards to temporal contingencies
-- this also relates to both the origins and restructuring
methodologies. In the origins methodology, the inquiry into emergent
organization followed the notion of definable, evolutionary states in
the life-history of an organization. Beginning with the beginning,
emergent organizations were in the process of becoming up until the
documentation of the fourth element required for organization truly
exist. Four elements present and the organization entered into a
maintenance state. This period of maintenance is the bedrock of the
restructuring methodology, and even though most, more ephemeral emergent
disaster relevant organizations do not "live” very long, restructuring,
in reality, could last for years. For social networks, there is no
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notion of a beginning, no way to tell if a networking relationship has
entered into a maintenance phase, and consequently no end -- unless,
possibly, when one organizational member ceases to exist. The
methodological result of this "timeless" quality, must then deal with
the potential of multiple element depictions, multiple event sequences
and one, potentially epochal networking arrangement.

Social Networks and Interdependence
This brings us back, again to the notion of kinds and degrees of
interdependence. From Thompson, we learn that interdependence, in short,
regards the situation where the efficacy, survivability, or viability of
an organization is dependent on some internal, cooperative processes
between its constituent parts. In true tautological fashion, if an
organization exists and operates, then, it does so by virtue of the
interdependent actions of its component parts. In sum, much akin to the
origins study, a unit is assumed in order to analyze degrees or types of
interdependence.
The network study, while searching for degrees of interdependence
between two organizations, does not assume an overall unit.
Interdependence between dyadic members is characterized according to the
total disaster response. In some cases, such as Case #055, two
organizations, or rather personnel representing the Wyoming Air National
Guard and the Warren Air Force Base Fire; Unit, were engaged in trying to
secure the National Guard Armory in the aftermath of a tornado. (The
social networking pattern is defined as T-R-A: a task structure through
a predisaster mutual aid agreement, resources were derived from the
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special fire fighting equipment supplied by the Warren Fire Unit, and
conjoined activities from the search and rescue operation which ensued.)
Because actions between these organizations occurred through one
temporally and spatially specifiable event, degrees of interdependence
relate to the joint activities which ensued and the overall operational
priorities of the event. In other words, in terms of securing the Armory
from potential fire hazards and searching for victims, as it seems, the
operation required the cooperation, that is, the interdependent actions
between these two organizations. The overriding system, although
unacknowledged, is coterminous with the contextual significance and
translatable domain for the event as a whole.
It is when the disaster responses of two organizations are linked
through multiple events with various disaster related activities, that
this analysis becomes inordinately complicated. For example, from Case
#004, two organizations, the Osage County Sheriff's Office and the
Kansas State Park Office, are characterized by social networks which
span three days and two observable events. The social networking pattern
is judged to be R-A-T, but this includes two resources transfers
immediately following the tornado hit the showboat Whippoorwill, an R-A
network involving the preparation of a missing persons list later that
evening, and a T-A network two days later which dealt with body
retrieval (i.e., the networking overall is R-R-R-A-T-A). Distilling
degrees of interdependence from such a densely packed array of network
links, without the benefit of a grounding and specifiable event context,
is quite a different matter from the example above.
It is clear from the interviews, in this case, that these two
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organizations were working closely together; however, by what criteria
does the analysis distill the "essence" of this social network, in terms
of degrees of interdependence, from these divergent characterizations.
Put another way, if Case #055 described above (which involved one
overall event sequence much like the origins study), would have been
characterized as R-A-T, could we equate the substantive significance of
this R-A-T sequence with the R-A-T characterization from Case #004?
In conclusion, for the network study to achieve continuity and
accuracy in the search for interdependence, social networks between
disaster relevant organizations should be analyzed by events in much the
same fashion as the origins Study. In this way, methodological outcomes
from the network study would read something like, during such and such
event which involved such and such an operation or emergent unit,
organizations A and B were observed to be linked in this fashion. From
this view, degrees of interdependence, from the network study, equate
nicely with stages in origins of emergent organization. If, however, the
social networking occurs across multiple and dissociated events, then
any combination of the elements, ostensibly regarding interdependence,
would not relate to organization at all. Thus, total number of elements
present would have nothing to do with stages of organization.
One apparent strength of the network methodology, revolves around
the possibility that two observable events, involving an organizational
dyad, may be substantively and empirically linked in some fashion (e.g.,
some organizational members may organize a search and rescue mission,
while other members actually conduct the search). In this case, the
holistic view of the disaster response, provided by the network study,
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would prove to provide

additional insights into organizational

networking dynamics across events. The origins methodology, in regarding
these same two hypothetical events, may have characterized them both in
terms of emergent units and self-contained processes; in essence,
effectively missing the overall response structure linking the two
events and thus the interdependence and/or organizational potential
between these two organizations at a more inclusive level.
Another dynamic which surfaced during this analysis, which was not
treated in the social network study, deals with the impact of emergent
units upon the array of social networks. Because member units in the
network study were equated with organizational units, no real
consideration was given to the possibility whereby segments of
organizations (i.e., personnel involvement in divergent spheres of
activities) become involved in instances of emergent organization. One
of the theoretical premises on which Kreps (and Bosworth, 1988:19) bases
his conception of organizational dynamics and statics, views that
absorption into more encompassing entities is "death" from the
standpoint of member units. Intra-organizational forces prevent
that from happening most of the time (Starbuck, 1983). In
ecological terms, autogenic (closed system) demands of member
units are in tension with and largely countervail allogenic (open
system) demands of the physical and social environment for more
inclusive forms of organization (McKelvey and Aldrich, 1983).
This is true for all organizational units which were involved in this
analysis -- at no time were these organizational units, as a whole,
under any serious threat of "absorption". Be that as it may, there are
cases, such as the Wichita Falls response, where members of these
organizations become involved in separate activity spheres and thus
develop internal processes and dynamics apart from the units from which
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they hail.
In the Mount Saint Helens disaster, organizational involvement was
scattered across a very involved response structure. A dense array of
network ties develops between four key organizations (the United States
Forestry Service and Sheriff's Departments from three abutting
counties), whereby they are mutually involved in at least three
Emergency Operations Centers, as well as multiple, more independent
operations. After four days, these four organizations become involved in
an overarching EOC (at Toledo, Washington) which is presumably in charge
of all consequent operations. What of the emergent operations which were
established prior to the EOC at Toledo? In one very important instance,
members of the Lewis County Sheriff's Office were involved (and had been
for three days) with military units from a nearby base. This operation,
the "ground search command center at Salkum", was headed by a deputy
sheriff from Lewis County -- one of the four controlling units at
Toledo. Nevertheless, this operation, even after the creation of the
controlling EOC at Toledo, did not relinquish its autonomy and continued
operations which were distinct and sometimes even at odds with the
Toledo EOC. In sum, regardless of prior affiliations, representatives of
the same organizational unit were involved in distinct events. These
events, and the emergent nature of organization explicit in each,
evidence the same organizational dynamics as separate organizational
units; that is, they fought to retain organizational autonomy and
integrity. The network methodology was not structured so as to analyze
dynamics of this sort.
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Social Networks and the Application of the Code
The networking methodology employs the "tightest** requirements
regarding application of the elements. The is in part due to criticism
concerning possible, overly broad interpretations of conceptual
boundaries for the code. It is also a function of the empirical and
conceptual subject matter. In what follows, the effect of the social
network study's unique units of analysis upon the code will be explored.
Domain
The methodological statement regarding documentation of domain (D)
for an organizational dyad, asks: Are the units identified and
legitimated externally as parts of a more inclusive entity? Right away,
we may note that intra-network processes cannot, in and of themselves,
result in domain legitimation. In other words, a third party is
required. Moreover, while it might be noted in passing that the notion
of "a more inclusive entity" has not been the strong suit of the network
methodology (in contrast to the origins methodology), the important
point here is the requirement that external observers must specify one
social network, presumably among many, for this special assessment. Even
in cases where emergent entities are in evidence (e.g., as in EOC's), it
is usually this emergent entity which receives recognition, not
particular, and arbitrary, pairings of the composite organizational
units.
In this analysis, only the Mount Saint Helens disaster response
elicited domain (D) confirmation between organizations. In this example,
the EOC at Toledo (described above) was definitely at the nexus of
coordination and control by the fourth day. This EOC was delineated as

94
the controlling ’'system" by more than one respondent; however, explicit
recognition or legitimation went to the EOC, as an inclusive entity, and
thus to all four organizational participants. Even here, specific
legitimation for one particular dyad was hard to come by.
Recalling the origins methodology and the designation of an
emergent unit prior to reconstruction by the code, we could say that the
Toledo EOC crossed the threshold of "Being". The consequent analytical
breakdown of this entity, by organizational dyads, in effect,
transferred Toledo's external legitimation to each member unit. This is
not the complete account, however. For the network study to apply domain
(D) to a dyad, it also had to be apparent that the predominant
activities of, and majority of activities from, each organization were
conducted out of this EOC. With this standard, only certain "more
inclusive entities" may be a functional component in the search for
domains (D). Put another way, if the Mount Saint Helens total response
environment were to be analyzed using the origins methodology, more than
likely, multiple instances of emergent organization would be located
across a multitude of event sequences. The external legitimacy (Domain)
granted the activity within each of these clusters would not necessary
survive a breakdown into constituent units, unless it could be shown
that these units were operating mainly out of this site. This
*
prerequisite for legitimation seems, to this reviewer, overly exacting
-- especially given, at least in the Mount Saint Helens case, the
severity of the disaster, the scope of the impacted area, and the
consequent fragmentation of organizational responses.
Still, the point remains well taken, that domain (D), in the
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network study, should specify and identify empirical instances whereby
organizational units have in some sense "merged" within a more inclusive
entity -- i.e., a new entity is unleashed. The origins study, in
essence, presumes organization as "thing" in search of process, while
the methodology in the social networks study is more accurately
described as the search for interorganizational process whereby
"thingness" is much harder to come by. In sum, legitimation for an
emergent unit, process, or effort (the origins approach), does not
immediately translate into legitimation for the interorganizational
processes of participant organizations. On the one hand, there is the
strategy which allows for easy methodological access to external
legitimation and thus dilutes the impact of entity status. On the other,
there is the strategy by which external legitimation of dyads,
empirically designated by the "merging" of two units, reaffirms the
magnitude of entity status, but extracts a heavy price in terms of
methodological austerity.
Tasks
Does the social network have a division of labor that is agreed to
by member units? The key here relates to the presence of an agreed upon
division of labor that involves organizational units as a whole.
Individual members of these organizations may be involved in task
structures which span events ranging from simple search and rescue
operations to complex evacuation procedures to state-wide disaster
response networks. In other words, task structures relating to emergent
units, and involving organizational members, from the origins study, may
not correlate with overall organizational involvement. So, how does the
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student of social networks decide when the task structure is
encompassing of entire units?
One possible empirical and logical conclusion is that heads or
ranking officials of organizational units are those responsible for
creating and agreeing to organizational involvement in an overarching
division of labor. Thus, it is important to note the involvement and
actions of ranking officials. However, it may also be the case that one
organization emerges as a focal point for coordination and control; the
decision-making power of this organization may then "employ" the aid of
other organizations. One way or another, the point is that a division of
labor for an emergent unit or effort does not automatically delineate a
task structure between all organizational units involved.
One example of this caveat comes to us from the Whippoorwill
incident and pertains to four organizational units, the Osage County
Sheriff's Office, the Lyndon County Sheriff's Office, the Fish and Game
Commission, and the Parks and Resources Authority -- six organizational
dyads. The event revolves around the retrieval of the bodies of those
who were drowned by the water bound tornado. From the interviews, we
learn that the Osage County Sheriff was in charge overall and, over the
course of the disaster response, a division of labor was concocted to
expedite the recovery of the deceased. While this division of labor, at
least from the origins perspective, seems to encompass the entire event,
in actuality (from the social networking; perspective), the task
structure (T) extends only from the creator to those implicated. In
other words, a task structure (T) involves only those dyads in which the
Osage County Sheriff's Office was a member unit.
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A possible explanation for Such a result could derive from, once
again, the criteria which inquires about a unit's

predominant

activities -- were these organization's predominant activities covered
by or held within this emergent division of labor? However, in the
Whippoorwill disaster, it happens that the predominant activities of
each of these units did revolve around the search and rescue of capsized
victims. Therefore, in this case at least, the task structure (T)
appears to take on a contractual or power-oriented base which links the
unit which created it with those who are implicated within it.
The Mount Saint Helens material yields a different example of the
application of a task structure. A task structure (T) is said to link
each of the organizations involved in the Toledo EOC. This is due in
part to the fact that no one organization was preeminent within this
group. And while personnel from each of these organizations are involved
in other important events, each with an emergent task structure, here,
the predominant activities of these organization's is determined to be
wrapped up within the conceptual boundaries of coordination and control.
In both cases, from a "holistic” approach, that is, taking the
entire event as a bastion of interorganizational process, a task
structure is obviously in evidence. However, it is only the Toledo
episode which seemingly applies such a holistic approach. The
Whippoorwill results point to the effect of taking the view of
organizational dyads in a vacuum; that is, the overarching task
structure is inconsequential in contrast to a strict interpretation of
social networks as the unit of analysis.
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Resources
Even in the network study, resources (R) is the element most
easily applied. Nevertheless, these resources are now linked with inter
organizational transfers. There are no criteria to designate whether the
transfers were one-time or continuous; by contract or by perceived need;
pivotal or tangential. This has never been an issue in any of the
studies.
There are two particulars, however, which did surface during this
analysis. One involves the transfers of resources from one unit to
another where the receiving unit is, in reality, some emergent entity.
For example, there are examples where important resources were donated
to Emergency Operation Centers. In this case, who or what units are to
be judged as the recipient of these resources? Each and every
organization involved in the machinery of the EOC? From this example we
see, again, shades of the dynamics of the origins methodology whereby
resources (R) are not always transferred from one entity to another, but
rather, identified by their relevance to an emerging unit or
significance within an event sequence.
The origins perspective has also crept into other examples of
social networks. In one organizational dyadic network, not explicitly
analyzed for this study, it was noted that a resource network was
documented between two organizations where those resources were not, in
reality, transferred anywhere. The case.involved some high-powered
military units who were involved in search and rescue operations;
according to one participant interviewed, they operated autonomously and
desired to maintain "organizational integrity." One of these units was,
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however, coordinating the effort so that there would be no overlapping
search missions. All the units had similar resources and all maintained
their resources for the duration. Nevertheless, a resource link was
documented between the organization in charge and the other
organizations who were present. As it seems, even though the resources
were not transferred from one unit to another, the organization in
charge, in essence, became synonymous with the effort at large. As the
effort was benefitted by the additional helicopters from the divergent
units, so was this controlling unit bequeathed the beneficiary. In sum,
resources (R) was applied in regards to the event, not to particular and
observable social networks between organizations.
Activities
For the network study, activities (A) is by far the element most
affected by the alteration of both units and foci of analysis. For a
methodology which stresses the applicability and crucial function of
observable social units, activities (A) could no longer be applied to
recount the nature of a bounded event -- an event for which individual
players were unimportant. However, in keeping with the temporal and
spatial properties of event sequences, the network methodology now
employs activities (A) in the search for temporally and spatially
conjoined action. This distinction is really a logical step in regards
to the analytical breakdown of the constituent units involved in some
emergent unit or effort. In other words, once the overall emergent
organization is broken into organizational dyads, the question becomes,
were organizational representatives, within this temporally and
spatially bounded event, themselves involved in temporally and spatially
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conjoined action?
The application of activities (A), in terms of conjoined action,
however, is not observed in relation to an event sequence. As a purely
structural designation, contextual qualifications as to its usage are
not of paramount importance. Thresholds for its application must, by
definition, deal with such matters as: How much time must elapse before
actions are considered conjoined? What are the spatial parameters for
conjoined action? And how many individuals from these organizational
units must be involved?
As Kreps is led to observe, "our judgments about the temporal and
spatial boundaries of conjoined action are quite narrow" (Kreps and
Bosworth, 1988:17). Perhaps, initially, it should be pointed out that
temporal parameters will not always correspond with spatial parameters;
spatial continuity always encapsules temporal. Therefore, it seems that
the spatial criterion are the more critical of the two. And regarding a
numerical threshold, again from Kreps (and Bosworth, 1988),
A precise numerical criterion of conjoined action is perhaps the
most difficult to identify and apply. Is a meeting involving
single representatives of dyad members conjoined action? Our
response is no because we feel that this happening is below a
threshold of pooled activities (Thompson, 1967). It may be
important because there is a transfer or exchange of information
about ongoing events (R). Is sustained involvement (in delimited
time and space as noted above) of larger numbers or proportions of
people from each unit conjoined action? Perhaps, but we think a
criterion of proportional involvement is better applied to member
activities themselves rather than the sheer number of people
engaged in them (p.17).
There are two important points which stand out from the quote
above, both of which qualify the structural nature of conjoined action
in favor of more contextual or contingent factors. First, the

characterization or notation of organizational activities becomes
important. In this case, conjoined action is defined first in terms of
whether or not the activities of enacting persons relate to the
predominant activities of their parent organization. If they do, then it
takes fewer participants to cross the threshold of conjoined action.
Many times, however, an organization's predominant disaster related
activities are discernible only from the sheer numbers of individuals
engaged in them. In other words, an organization's predominant
activities become what an organization actually does. This observation
biases interpretation in favor of "blue-collar" domains or activities.
In this event, the actions of individuals within an Emergency Operations
Center, for example, become less important conceptually than those of
the individuals who their decisions ultimately affect. Thus, the
activities of those individuals within an EOC become relegated to the
realm of resources (R).
In the second instance, Kreps brings up the notion of pooled
activities or pooled interdependence as a criteria for conjoined action.
This has been a continuing source of confusion for this reviewer in that
how can one speak of interdependence without specifying what the
organizational unit's and individual's actions are supposed to be
interdependent in relation to? It could be said that every collectivity
described in relation to time, space, and number is nothing more,
nothing less than a crowd. Some crowds are large, and some are small. A
meeting involving single representatives from, maybe six organizations,
constitutes a small crowd. This meeting may define and control the
actions of each constituent organization for the duration of the
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response, the representatives may allocate positions of power and
responsibility, and they may become the legitimate "spokesgroup" for
each organization and the larger community. In sum, the "crowd" is an
organized body, which is dependent upon the continued support of each
contributing organization. Their actions, representative of their parent
organizations and interdependent in relation to the "operation" or
"system" as a whole, do not, however, constitute conjoined action.
This example above, describes exactly the Toledo EOC involved in
the Mount Saint Helens eruption. From the comforting prescience of
contextual inquiry, we know that the Toledo EOC directed the efforts of
the organizations which were represented there. Actions were undertaken
on behalf of the system, and this system, efficacious or not, was
dependent on the continued perseverance of its representatives.
Conjoined actions (A) were not documented at this site because it could
not be said either that 1) the predominant disaster related activities
of units represented at the EOC were synonymous with coordination and
control, or that 2) the organizational units were operating
predominantly out of this EOC.
In other social networking cases, there may be multiple instances
of conjoined action (A). Like examples where there may be multiple
instances of resource (R) transfers, the actual conceptual (and
empirical) significance of these elemental appearances is dependent upon
either 1) the holistic view of the context for these elements, or 2) the
notation and thus definition of either resource (R) or activities (A) by
tasks (T) or domain (D). Since the holistic view is not necessarily
relevant to the networking methodology, we may assume, in other words,
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that conjoined action (A) (and resource (R)) assumes some empirical, and
ostensibly, conceptual significance in terms of interdependence when
coupled with task (T) or domain (D). Since domain (D) is extremely
difficult to document, it is really task (T) which may 1) delineate one
observable event or overall effort, 2) define the event in terms of both
overall character, raison d'etre, and structure of participant
activities, and 3) the importance of activities or resources within that
event. In essence, conjoined action (A) cannot, by itself, undeniably
speak to degrees of interdependence. While it may indeed document
interdependence in relation to two organizational unit's activities
under the umbrella of some deliberate joint venture, in conclusion, the
structural criteria for its documentation, do not guarantee this
epistemological outcome.
In summary, conjoined activities and the interdependence they may
represent seem contingent upon a holistic portrayal of unit involvement.
Furthermore, empirically, it seems that the notion of conjointness
becomes less crucial in terms of unit interdependencies as more
formalized units are analyzed. Conjoined action for informal
collectivities is extremely important. However, for larger units, in
line with Thompson's argument, tasks (the overall division of authority
and performance) and technologies seem to be more accurate predictors of
overall interdependence between component sub-systems.
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DISCUSSION AND FINAL THOUGHTS

Collins has said that he finds activities (A) analytically merged
within each and every element -- only human beings enact social process
(correspondence between Collins and Kreps, 1986). Collins, however, is
seeking to reconstruct social reality via a commitment to the empirical
and ontological sanctity of the individual. From Warriner we glimpse a
contrasting explanation of what is to be explained:
Because of the metaphoric origins of the use of the term
’structure' we must continually reaffirm two basic facts about
social phenomena in order to avoid major arguments over its use.
That is, we must continue to remind ourselves (a) that the units
whose relationships constitute social structure, unlike units in
physical structure, are not autonomous entities whose character is
fixed by processes antecedent to and independent of the structural
processes themselves; and (b) that the relationships of those
units are not static, spatial dimensions, but activity processes
between the units. That is, ’social space' is defined by what the
units do in relation to each other (1981:180).
Here we are introduced to the notion of social "units” where those units
are left unspecified in nature. Consonant with Kreps' epistemological
focus, activity processes between social units constitute the social
phenomenon to be explained. These activity processes are, for Kreps,
construed as forms of association.

The activity processes described

above, and the "social space" they inhabit, cannot be delineated unless
some decision is made concerning viable "social units". That is, what
are the units of analysis? To this end, Drabek (1988) has said:
If any form of comparative analysis is to occur, we must delineate
the object of study. Thus, when asked, "to what can we generalize
your findings?" we must clearly answer in terms of our units of
analysis. And some researchers are asking questions wherein events
are the units, whereas others are focused on individuals,
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organizations, or what have you (Drabek, 1988: 259).
Thus, from a perspective of theoretical commitments (re Collins and
Warriner), we are asked to make known what are considered properly
"ultimate" units of analysis. Kreps, from a structuralist standpoint,
has stated that both the individual and larger social "entities" (e.g.,
organizations) are equally plausible structural and processual conduits.
Some attention was given above to the relationship between these two
units to make the point that both individuals and encompassing social
units are, at once, separate entities and yet reducible to the other.
This theoretical distinction, however, does not deal with the
difficulty in reconciling and transposing individual activity with
organizational activity. In other words, individual and unit enactments,
which may be mutually constitutive of empirical events, may also be
broken down into typological categorizations. For instance, concerning
the individual, some activities are indeed solely representative of the
individual which enacted them; that is, organizational affiliations are
irrelevant. In other cases, "individuals are performing boundaryspanning functions so as to lace requisite resources from numerous
autonomous units into a more integrated whole (Drabek, 1988: 261).
Moreover, in a conceptually generic formulation, we could note that
individuals, as a result of nonroutine happenings, often 1) take on new
roles or commitments, 2) instigate new and unique social networks with
other individuals, 3) combine activity processes with other individuals
to form larger social units. (Interestingly, these activities or
processes correspond with the specific organizational enactments
represented through Kreps' research (restructuring, networking, and
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origins). Thus, micro processes may mimic macro processes on a
conceptual level.) In regards to organizational enactments, Drabek has
introduced a typology which
differentiated between: (1) structural adaptations in ongoing and
continuing systems; (2) newly created structures that emerged
within such systems; (3) emergent systems that appeared to span
across the boundaries of several previously established systems;
and (4) newly created systems that emerged outside of and
independent of any ongoing structure (1988:263).
From a methodological standpoint, Drabek statement above (p.113)
emphasizes the importance of making known one's particular analytical
"units of analysis". These form the.conceptual subject matter for any
particular study -- the definable "social space" if you will (from
Warriner) -- whether it be emergent organization, social networks
between organizational units, or discrete unit restructuring.
Ironically, the various researcher commitments to which Drabek refers
(i.e., events, organizations, and individuals), mirror the multitudinous
facets of the complex nature of social reality to which Kreps et al.
have given attention. Studies of origins, for example, focus on events
of organizing. The network and restructuring studies both focused on
organizational dynamics. As of late, individual role enactments have
become an object of inquiry (see Bosworth and Kreps, 1988). And an
important point here is that just as individuals and social units are at
once discrete yet reducible to the other, the methodological foci of the
origins, networking and restructuring studies are at once unique, yet
mutually constitutive of some empirical event sequence or totality.
The potential problem overall, at least in terms of the disaster
scenario, lies in reconciling these typologies of "unit" enactments with
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methodological foci of analysis. Additionally, only by combining these
two distinctions into some integrated (or conceptually specific) whole,
may the road be sufficiently clear to yield accurate taxonomic
portrayals of forms of association. As it stands now, Kreps' structural
code seems to drive empirical event depictions instead of the other way
around. The truly generic theoretical property spaces of the elements
have a way of transcending both unit enactments and methodological focus
such that taxonomic sequences do not make clear the substantive nature
of the social phenomena they purportedly describe. The case was made
above, in reference to this point, that element sequences (such as T-RA) and their conceptual translation, change with regards to a particular
study. And this is due to the fact that differing units and foci of
analysis influence the use of the code.
However important it is to state up-front the units and foci of
analysis -- and then to implement some methodological strategy designed
for such phenomenon -- there are other hazards. Kreps' studies have
identified important and researchable aspects of the social
organizational environment. However, as has been stated throughout this
thesis, within every temporally and spatially definable event there are
aspects of social unit emergence, social networking between units, and
unit restructuring -- interspersed and driven by individual actions
(Collins, 1986). Furthermore, the reality of emergent entities renders
the social organizational environment (and the possibility of
constructing structural hierarchies) a constantly evolving process.
Therefore, much like the difficulties faced in biological taxonomies,
even though Kreps' structural code represents a "core species" depiction
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of social structural dynamics, emergent entities (or species) are not
immediately translatable into generic forms. This is due in part to the
fact that these entities, or the events in which they occur, may have
empirical and conceptual properties which relate to more than one study
(origins, restructuring, or networks) -- much like new species may have
biological components which span generic descriptive criteria. Were
these multiple characteristic events to be analyzed according to the
structural code (is now implemented across the three methodologies), the
result would yield three unique, and yet uncomplementary or conflicting
portraits.
Perhaps what needs to be done in some future study is to combine
the three studies into one overall methodology, and then focus this
inclusive analytical power onto some disaster-related empirical
totality. Findings from this cooperative study should, in fact, yield
important methodological conclusions as the description of events within
events (and units within units) are made a paramount issue.
Additionally, this tripartite approach may either tighten the conceptual
boundaries of each element or else, just as importantly, show where
their conceptual weaknesses lie. This study has begun the process by
pointing to both the strengths and weaknesses of each of three studies
and their points of similarity and dissimilarity. Additionally, the
analysis of Kreps' code, as it is applied to the units and foci of these
divergent yet complementary studies, ha6> shown that unique element
imperatives and definitions from each study do not easily make the
transition to another study. In other words, for example, the tightened
element definitions and application of the social network methodology,
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were it applied to the origins case materials, would substantially
reduce the number of emergent organizations found.
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Endnotes
1) Only one methodological reference is made in the origins study about
the character of actual participants. This was the variable, "Type of
Focal Organization", which ascertained whether or not the organization
in question was "emergent groups of individuals" or "emergent groups of
other groups and organizations." Additionally, this independent variable
also established whether the focal organization fell within certain
categories of existing organizations (e.g., public or private
bureaucracies or voluntary agencies). This is interesting because such a
characterization seems to designate restructuring rather than emergence.
Regardless of "type", this distinction did not influence later use of
the code, except maybe to sensitize the reviewer to the nature of the
organization (e.g., emergent from individuals would seem to more closely
reflect collective behavior than emergent from existing organizations).
2) A distinction needs to be drawn here in regards to Kreps' total
origins case file. Of 423 cases analyzed, only 52 were considered truly
emergent from either individuals or organizations. The remaining cases
described, in particular, the restructuring of existing organizations -public or private. The case diagrammed below, while an example of the
restructuring of a public bureaucracy, nevertheless makes apparent the
multiple dynamics held within a single event -- regardless of prior
characterization.
3) For all cases obtained through the DRC archives, descriptions will
proceed under the cloak of anonymity. In keeping with Kreps' previous
event descriptions, cases are referred to by number. Because Drabek was
less stringent in maintaining the anonymity of particular disasters and
participants, however, case examples from his study will be referenced
by either name of impacted locale or case number.
4) For a thorough presentation of the notion of extending or expanding
organizations, see Dynes, 1970.
5) It might be wondered about the situation where activities (A) precede
domain (D) or tasks (T). How can activities (A) be observed if there is
as yet no domain (D) or task structure (T) to define it? For the origins
methodology, since the event has already been noted and an emergent unit
identified, domain (small D) , or that organization's discernable,
predominant sphere of activities (in relation to the population of
enacting organizations), has equally been defined. Therefore, activities
(A) can be observed as the first element if 1) these activities fit the
emergent unit's overall domain, and 2) these activities in some way
facilitate the "becoming" of the complete organization (see, for
example, the event described in the Methods and Issues section under
"Origins").
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